f AccordiDK to Schiirer It was not till after the time of Christ that ' Rabbi 'became a title ; Id the Uospels it Is not a title, but a reswrthil form of address.
: Cf. Atnth I. 1: The men of the Oreat Sj-naKoiruo 'said three tbint^s: Be deliberate in Jurl^^ment; and raise up many dladple* ; a id make a fence to the Toruh.'
changes that were taking pl.ace in the national life rendered some of the old enactments highly inconvenient, if not obsolete. How, under these changed conditions, was it possible to live in accordance with the general principles of the Law ! How were these new cases to be met'; The solution of these difficulties was one of the leading occupations of the scribes. By means of an exegesis which was freqiiently very artificial, they not only based existing legal tradition more or less directly on the written Law, but also deduced from it rules that would meet the new case ; or they met it by giving to some saying or recent custom of the 'wise' the value of lixed legal tradition They were not satislied, however, with expound ing the Law and tradition so as to meet actuallj occurring cases. They busied themselves in pro- viding for all conceivable cases that might occur, and especially in making a hedge or fence round the Law, i.e. in so expanding the compass of legal precept beyond what was laid down in the Penta- teuch and in the oldest form of tradition, that it niijjht be impossible for a man, if he observed all their traditional rules, to be even tempted to trans- gress the Law. * From being ' exegetes of the Law ' the scribes thus became legislators ; they not only made the Law more precise, but also introduced into it many innovations, supplementing and, in some eases, abolishing it, by ttieir inferences and traditions. Still they had no intention of inno\at- ing ; they were great sticklers for antiquity ; they only meant to say what was old (cf. Wellhausen, IJG' 284).
This ever-accumulating mass of legal traditions and of legal determinations was called Halacha.t It was equally binding with the written Law, the two together constituting the absolute rule of life. It was given by God to Moses at Sinai ; Moses delivered it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the prophets, and the projiheta to the men of the Great Synagogue I, A both i. 1, where Torah = the oral law; cf. Weber, op. cit. 88 ff.). It was the authentic interpretation and Buppleirent of the Torah ; Jehovah not only taught Moses the Torah, but also its authentic interpretation, or the lex oralis {Pes-ikta 38a, in Weber, 89). In theory the written Law was the highest norm ; but in practi<.e the scribes assigned
freater importance to the oral law (cf. Mt IS*"', Ik l'"-). They interpreted the Law by tradition, which was 'the fence to Torah' (Aboth iii. 20). 'The Bible was understood by the help of the Halacha, quite as much as the llalacha was based upon the Bible '(W. R. Smith, op. cit. 64). It was more necessary to learn and teach tradition than Scrii)ture. The transgression of Rabbinic precei)t8 was sin. Whoever transgressed the words of the wise was worthy of death. ' An ott'ence against the sayings of the scribes is worse than one against those of Scripture' (Snnh. xi. 3, quoted in Eders- lieim, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah., i. 98 ; cf. also Weber, op. cit. 102 ff.). They never- theless maintained that tradition was essentially nothing more than the interpretation and more sjiecitic determination of the Torah, from which, tney alleged, all legal decisions were derived (cf.
• Cf. W. R. Smith, OTJC ei 13 47] ; Taylor, op. at. 11 : 'to make a fence to the Torah means to impose a(l<Iitional restric- tions so a-s to keep at a safe distance from forl)idden ground.' Streane, Th« Age 0/ thf Maccahfft, 22: 'The tenn means the prohibition of things innocent in themselves, but bordering too closely for safety on tliiii^js forbidden.' Wel>er, op. cit. 133, gives the following example : It was forbidden to drink the wine of the Oentiles, because they were never certain that Ihej did not thereby come into contact witli idolatry.
t lliUdchd means literuily 'going,' * way,' hence fig. 'custom, ' usage,' ' rule,' esp. one fixed traditionally, iue a majorUiu4 tra4ii/»mOVeberl,03); ' Halacha was legal teaching, sj-stematiKed legal precept . . . the system of niles applying tin- I'entateuchal law to every case of practice and every detail of llfe'(W. &. Smith, op. cit. 6S).
422
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Weber, 96 ff.). Whether an inference or a custom should become a binding hnliichd was determined by the majority of those distinguished for learn- ing. It was thus also that they decided the diu'erences between the rival schools of Hillel and Shammai. Theoretically, the Iu1lach6th were un- cliaiigeable ; but for various reasons it was im-
Sossible to maintain this principle in practice, lut a hCddcha could be cliangcil or abolished only with the consent of a majority of the Wise. ' One Sanhedrin cannot abrogate the decision of anothei Sanhedrin, unless it be superior in wisdom and in number' (Eduyothi. 5, quoted in Montet, op. rit. 231).