THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
both in nature and extent from the jurisdiction of the ancient and medieval Church. The changes have been brought about very largely by the changed relations of political i. Modern and ecclesiastical institutions. These Trend. modifications have been developing since the sixteenth century and have paralleled the changes in doctrine and forms of worship. They have at times originated with the churches themselves, but more frequently have resulted from the action of the civil power. While the jurisdiction of the medieval Church covered to a varying extent the institution of marriage, the execution and probate of wills, and the descent of property, and included also a considerable minor criminal jurisdiction over the clergy, the modern churches are by the State deprived of such jurisdiction and confined to matters defined by the civil power as purely spiritual in their objects. Where an ecclesiastical body is by law established, as is the case with the Church of England (see England, Church of), the civil power fixes for the Church its organization and jurisdiction. The modifications since the Reformation have been gradual. The changes in jurisdiction have been most radical where, as in the United States, the Church has ceased to be a governmental institution. The sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction exercised by the American churches has been outlined by the supreme court of the United 2. Funda- States in the case of Watson vs. Jones mental Law (13 Wallace, U. S. Reports 679, as in the follows: United ' ' ^n tms country the full and free right to
mi entertain any religious belief, to practise
any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression of any religious doctrine and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations and officers within the general association is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total suppression of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decisions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."
This sphere of liberty for the purpose of religion has been defined in detail by principles laid down by the civil power. While modern states have in some cases relinquished the power to legislate in ecclesiastical matters, they have everywhere reserved the power to define the sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and no matter what may be the desires of a church body for added powers over its members, the rule of the State is absolute. Modern states, in defining the powers of bodies organized for the purposes of religion, have not enacted formal codes stating the jurisdiction of such bodies in detail; but they have laid down general principles in the civil courts in the adjudication of cases
brought about through church controversies. The civil courts of the United States have in the century past developed some fundamental principles applicable to all the religious organizations of the land which have become law wherever American sovereignty has been extended. Similar principles have been worked out by the civil courts in all parts of the British empire.
The basic principle of modern ecclesiastical jurisdiction is that all ecclesiastical relations must be
voluntary both in their inception and
3. Elemen- in their duration. This rule applies
tary Prin- as well to church membership as to the
ciples. holding of ecclesiastical office. Xo
ecclesiastical relations are of the nature of a civil contract in law. The closest juridical analogy is to an obligation in equity. Such relations can be severed at any time without incurring civil disabilities. The polity of the denomination and the obligations laid down in a discipline as assumed by a member do not, from the standpoint of the State, change the voluntary character of the relationship. Another elementary principle limiting ecclesiastical jurisdiction is that the law of the land is law for the churches. So much of the civil law as applies must be read into the internal or canon law of all religious organizations. So also the internal law of religious bodies can validly contain nothing that contradicts the principles of the common and statute law of the land. The churches, therefore, may enact no rule overriding, restraining, or curtailing the civil rights of their members. Nor can the churches make a valid attempt to exempt their members from their civil and political obligations. Thus a church body may not validly discipline its members for exercising the elective franchise or serving upon juries or taking up arms in defense of the State. A further limitation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is found in the principle that church courts can not with legal sanction adjudicate civil controversies among their members, although the parties may have voluntarily submitted their cases to such courts. No decision can be rendered that will bar the parties from their right of appeal to the civil courts.
With these as fundamental principles of limitation found in the polity of all the states of western
civilization, modern ecclesiastical ju-
4. Limits risdiction and discipline are definitely
of Ecclesi- limited to the conduct of moral and
astical Ju- spiritual operations, cooperation for
risdiction. the purposes of religion, propaganda
of faith, charity, and education. The churches are at liberty to define their faith and to regulate their own affairs. They may lay down rules of conduct for their members and prescribe what manner of life they shall live. Such a life, however, must be in accord with the prevailing standards of public morality, and such standards are in the last analysis fixed by the exercise of the police power of the State by the civil authorities. In many instances modern religious organizations have endeavored to prescribe for their members modes of life not in accordance with the prevailing standards of public morality. There have been attempts to institute abnormal relations of the