THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
RESERVATION, ECCLESIASTICAL: In Germany the historic principle legally settled that any clerical belonging to one of the three recognized state religious establishments who passes from one to the other loses his position and his stipend, both returning into the possession of the church to which he belonged. The question first came up in the negotiations of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (q.v.) in 1555, on the question whether the terms of peace should be extended to those who afterward went over to the Lutherans. The Roman Catholics proposed that archbishops, bishops, and members of chapters, orders, and the like be excepted; that an apostate from the older religion lose his position and office; and that the chapter or other body be unmolested in the election of his successor from the older faith, who should remain peacefully in possession, while the matters of elections, foundations, presentations, and properties of chapters, churches, and dioceses should maintain their former status. The Protestants regarded these proposals as in the highest degree prejudicial not only to principle and person but also to religion. They proposed in turn that where any ecclesiastical territory had altered its religion it be turned over to no temporal authority or heritage, but in the case of the death or resignation of an ecclesiastic, such territory be left unmolested in its election, administration, and properties, the matter to be left open for further negotiation by the two parties; and this without trespass upon the majesty and usage of the secular, powers. King Ferdinand favored the Roman Catholic position in the interest of the conservation of rights and of peace. The Lutherans made certain concessions, agreeing to the contention of the other side with the proviso of not anticipating future conventions. These provisions did not really settle the difficulty. The archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbeys, and prelatures, were in the hands of the younger princes of Roman Catholic houses; the canonries usually were given to the younger sons of counts and knights of the realm, many of whom were Protestants. By being excluded from these ecclesiastical positions, the 300 Protestants felt that their material interests were damaged. The Roman Catholics were afraid that by allowing the Protestants to occupy these positions they would secure a majority of votes in the imperial diet. Soon after the edict of religious peace had been issued the Lutherans protested against the article, and threatened to disregard it. They repeated their protests at every successive diet and further demanded the recognition of Protestant administrators in the spiritual provinces and their admission to the sessions of the diets, but in vain. In North Germany the reservation was unobserved and many districts were in the hands of the Lutheran administrators. Moreover, where ecclesiastical foundations were not immediately dependent on the empire, as in the case of Brandenburg and elsewhere, the article was not applied, exemption from it being claimed. In Strasburg compromises in 1604 maintained the mixed religious state of the district. Further progress was opposed by the Jesuits under whose influence the Roman Catholic constituents insisted at the Diet of Regensburg (1613) on the thorough
carrying-out of the directions of the religious peace with respect to the ecclesiastical reservation. The question was again brought to an acute stage in the Thirty Years' War. After the successes of the Roman Catholic arms the Emperor Ferdinand II., Mar. 6, 1629, issued the so-called edict of restitution. According to this, the Protestant estates, in accordance with the terms of the Passau compromise (1552), had no right to appropriate ecclesiastical foundations, and to violate the reservation with reference to archbishoprics and bishoprics. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, had the right to demand the appointments of their archbishops, bishops, and prelates in immediate imperial provinces and monasteries. The emperor announced that he would dispatch commissions; and a considerable number of restitutions had been undertaken, when changes in the fortunes of war prevented the immediate execution of this measure. The question was settled by the Peace of Westphalia (see Westphalia, Peace of), whereby the right of ecclesiastical reservation was not only upheld but also legalized for the benefit of Protestants as well. From that time it has been in practise. (E. Feiedbeeg.)
Bibliography: L. Ranke, Zur deutschen Geschichte vom Religions frieden bis zum dreissigjahrigen Kriege, Leipsic, 1869; T. Tupez, Der Streit urn die geistlichen Gilter und das Restitutionsedikt (1629), pp. 12 sqq., 77 sqq., Vienna, 1883; J. H. Gebauer, Kurbrandenburg und das Restitutionsedikt, Halle, 1899.
RESERVATION, MENTAL: A secret mental restriction or repression in thought, an offense against the duty of truthfulness by which a part of the truth is concealed, and so an intentional deceit prepared. It may refer either to the past or the future; to the statement of what is alleged to have happened or to be at hand, or to an assurance of something to be rendered or kept. The assertory as well as the promissory oath can thus give occasion to its commission. It may also occur in daily social intercourse. Mental reservation plays a considerable role in the lax moral system of the Jesuits. Many of their authors as well as some Roman Catholic moralists outside supported the use of this reservation. Among the former J. Caramuel was the most thorough-going in his Haplotes de restrictionibus mentalibus (Leyden, 1672). Antoninus Diana (d. 1663) taught that " if any one voluntarily offers to take an oath, by necessity or for some utility, he may use double meanings, for he has a just ground for using them " (Resolutiones morales, II., tract 15, 25-26, III., tract 5, 100 and 6, 30). So if any one requests a loan from another which the other can not give, he may say that he does not have it, reserving the mental addition, in order to loan it to him. If one is asked about a crime of which he is the only witness, he can say that he does not know it, adding mentally, as an openly known crime. On proper grounds, an ambiguous oath does not involve perjury, if, without change of form, the ambiguous sense may be produced; one does not need to confess to a committed offense before a court, if thereby an injury to self is invited; one can deny having committed it, with the reservation in mind, " in prison." Knowingly to lead any one to take a false oath is no sin because the person