In the succeeding period interest centred in the question of the precise nature of the Deut. con- dition justifying divorce, and the vagueness of the language in which the wife’s offence was described gave rise to one of the most famous of rabbinical controversies: What was the ‘unseemly thing’ (22 nny, lit. ‘nakedness of a thing,’ LXX ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα) The account of the dispute is given as follows in the Mishna (Gitfin ix. 10) :—
‘The schoo] of Shammai says, ‘‘No one shall divorce bis wife
In the ordeal of the bitter waters (so called as the instrument of a curse) we have doubtless an ancient custom surviving in a modified form, and amended in the interests of good sense and humanity. Similar practices have been discovered among other peoples, e.g. in Sierra Leone and Upper Guinea, and, according to various authori- ties, in the African practice it is common to employ a deadly poison, when the accused may hope to escape only by the accident of vomiting, or by the surreptitious use of an antidote. In the OT legislation, on the other hand, the case was not prejudged against the accused ; the ingredients of the potion were innocuous, and reliance was placed on exposure through divine intervention. That the ordeal was at least occasionally efficacious in revealing guilt through the workings of fear and an accusing conscience, need not be doubted.
From the long persistence in Christendom of the judicium Dei in various forms (judicium ignis, aqui, panis adjurati, etc.), the last trace of which only disappeared in the 18th century, it may be surmised that the ordeal appeals strongly to human nature. But among the Jews as among the Christians, experience bred doubts as to its trustworthiness. Sometimes the curse failed to operate, and that although the guilt was morally certain, or was established by later discoveries. Of such miscarriages of justice two explanations were offered. God, it might be said, stayed His hand because adultery had become so common among the accusing husbands that they had lost all claim to justice as against their wives.* Another reason was discovered in the doctrine of ‘merits,’ and it was suggested that, on the ground of other good deeds, the woman might, if not altogether escape, at least have the punishment deferred. But at all events it was no longer relied upon, and so naturally fell into disuse.
v. THE LEGAL DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.— Divorce (Old Eng. Aiw-gedales, forlaeton, Germ. Ehescheidung) is expressed in Heb. and Gr. by a number of words embodying the idea of dismissal or separation. The usual Heb. verb is nbw ‘to send away,’ LXX ἐξαποστέλλειν (Dt 22”, Jer 31), and for the peotite of divorce n>v is once used (Mal 916), in the later books xy: occurs in Hiph. (‘make to go forth,’ Ezr 108-19), A divorced woman is 77372 πον (Ly 217, Ezk 44"). The bill of divorce (Old Eng. hiw-gedales b6k, later ‘book of forsaking’) is 759 no? (Dt 24"). In classical Greek the legal terms are ἀποπέμπεσθαι, ἀποπομπή (of the man), ἀπόλειψις (usually of the woman). In the Greek of NT their place is taken by three verbs: (1) ἀπολύειν, used throughout the Synopt. (Mt 1} 59-8, Mk 1074, Lk 1638); (2) ἀφιέναι, which with St. Paul describes the action either of husband or wife in
romoting divorce (1 Co 7! 1, cf. Rey 22), but in
ynopt. has the meaning of ‘leaving’ a wife at death to another (Mt 22") ; (3) χωρίζειν, χωρίζεσθαι, ‘to separate, depart,’ then (cf. scheiden) to ter- minate a marriage union (1 Co 7-15), In the translation of those terms, both AV and RV are timid about using ‘divorce,’ and prefer the vaguer phrases of deo away’ (ἀπολύειν) and ‘depart’ (χωρίζειν), the explanation of which is to be sought in a desire partly to mark the fact that ancient and modern divorce are on a different legal footing, partly to avoid prejudicing the much dis- puted question as to the dissolubility of marriage.
* ‘After that adulterers multiplied, the bitter waters ceased, and R. Jochanan Saccai abolished their use according to Hos 414 I will not punish your daughters when they commit whoredom, for they themselves go apart,’ etc.—Mishna, Sota, cap. 9, Surenhusius, iii. p. 291.
MARRIAGE
unless there shall have been found in her some unchastity (737 my ‘a thing or matter of nakedness’), since it is written, Because he hath found the nakedness of a thing (127 ΠῚ") in her”; the school of Hillel says, “‘ Even if she shall have burned his food in cooking, since it is written, Because he hath found in her the nakedness of a thing” (i.e. anything); R. Akiba says, ‘Even if he find another fairer than ghe, as it is written, If she find no favour in his eyes.”’ As indicated in this passage, the latitudinarian view was adopted on the ground that the
‘overning principle is laid down in the opening clause ‘if she
ind no favour in his eyes,’ and it was also supported by refer- tnce to v.38, where it is implied that a second husband will also divorce the woman if he hate her. The emphasis was also laid on ‘matter’ rather than on ‘ unseemly,’ thereby suggesting that the unseemliness might appear in various matters. The school of Shammai treated the second clause as the significant one, and emphasized ‘unseemly,’ which they interpreted as meaning immoral or at least indecent conduct. The opinion of Hillel was generally adopted as the true representation of the state of the law (‘decisio juxta scholam Hillelis,’ Maimon. in Joc.), although it is to be remembered that many who endorsed the | reshaie as jurists condemned it as moralists. ‘Over him who