This immediate reference to God as their king is clearly seen as the groundwork of their entire polity. The foundation of the whole law of land, and of its re- markable provisions against alienation, lies in the decla- ration, " The land is mine, and ye are strangers and so- journers with me" (Lev. xxv, 23). As in ancient Home all land belonged properly to the state, and under the feudal system in mediaeval Europe to the king, so in the Jewish law the true ownership lay in Jehovah alone. The very system of tithes embodied only a peculiar form of tribute to their king, such as they were familiar with in Egypt (see Gen. xlvii, 23-2(5) ; and the offering of the first-fruits, with the remarkable declaration by which it was accompanied (see Deut. xxvi, 5-10), is a direct acknowledgment of God's immediate sovereign- ty. As the land, so also the persons of the Israelites are declared to be the absolute property of the Lord by the dedication and ransom of the first-bom (Exod. xiii, 2- 13, etc.), by the payment of the half shekel at the num- bering of the people " as a ransom for their souls to the Lord" (Exod. xxx, 11-16), and by the limitation of power over Hebrew slaves as contrasted with the abso- lute mastership permitted over the heathen and the so- journer (Lev. xxv, 39-46).
From this theocratic nature of the law follow impor- tant deductions with regard to (a) the Aiew which it takes of political society ; (6) the extent of the scope of the la^v ; (c) the penalties by which it is enforced ; and (d) the character which it seeks to impress on the peo- ple.
(1.) The basis of human society is ordinarily sought, by law or philosophy, either in the rights of the indi- vidual, and the y)artial delegation of them to political authorities; or in the mutual needs of men, and the re- lations which spring from them ; or in the actual exist- ence of power of man over man, whether arising from natural relationship, or from benefits confeiTcd, or from physical or intellectual ascendency. The maintenance of society is supposed to depend on a "social compact" between governors and subjects; a compact, true as an abstract idea, but untrue if supposed to have been a his- torical reality. The !Mosaic law seeks the basis of its polity, first, in the absolute sovereignty of God; next, in the relationship of each individual to God, and through God to his countrymen. It is clear that such a doc- trine, while it contradicts none of the common theories, yet lies beneath them all, and shows why each of them, being only a secondarj- deduction from an ultimate truth, cannot be in itself sufficient ; and, if it claim to be the whole truth, will become an absurdity. It is the doc- trine which is insisted upon and develoi)ed in the whole series of pro])hecy, and which is brought to its perfec- tion only when applied to that universal and spiritual kingdom for which the IMosaic system was a ])rcparation.
(2.) The law, as proceetUng directly from God, and
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referring directly to him, is necessarily absolute in its su- jyremacy and unlimited in its scope.
It is supreme over the governors, as being only the delegates of the Lord, and therefore it is incompatible with any despotic authority in them. This is seen in its limitation of the power of the master over the slave, in the restrictions laid on the priesthood, and the ordination of the " manner of the kingdom" (Deut. xvii, 14-20; comp. 1 Sam. x, 25). By its establishment of the hereditary priesthood side by side with the author- ity of the heads of tribes (" the princes"), and the sub- sequent sovereignty of the king, it provides a balance of po\vers, all of which are regarded as subordinate. The absolute sovereignty of Jehovah was asserted in the ear- lier times in the dictatorship of the judge, but much more clearly under the kingdom by the spiritual com- mission of the prophet. By his rebukes of priests, princes, and kings for abuse of their power, he was not only defending religion and morality, but also maintain- ing the divinely-appointed constitution of Israel.
On the other hand, it is supreme over the governed, recognising no inherent rights in the individual as pre- vailing against, or limiting the law. It is therefore un- limited in its scope. There is in it no recognition, such as is familiar to us, that there is one class of actions di- rectly subject to the coercive power of law, while other classes of actions and the whole realm of thought are to be indirectly guided by moral and spiritual influence. Nor is there any distinction of the temporal authority which wields the former power from the spiritual au- thority to which belongs the other. In fact, these dis- tinctions woidd have been incompatible with the char- acter and objects of the law. They depend partly on the want of Ibresight and power in the lawgiver ; they could have no place in a system traced directly to God : they depend also partly on the freedom which belongs to the manhood of our race ; they could not, therefore, be appropriate to the more imperfect period of its j-outh.