the list of the faithful outs. See Moral Theology.
The expressed opinion of a < 'hiiivh doctor forms a Buffi- cicnt basis for a legitimate moral decision. The eternal a i nl object ive foundation- of the moral law are thus ex- changed lor the subjective view of individual persons of eminence (see Wuttke, Christian Ethics, i. 261 263). Not only is the deciding element the individual, instead ol the Church, but that individual whose decision best suits the inquirer (see Sanchez, Op. ifor. i. 9, n. 12 sip. n. 21; Laymann, Theol. Afor. \ L625] i,ll). Prob- abilism is a term used in philosophic parlance, as we may see in the article Prob w.i.i . hut iii ( 'hri.-tian the- ology it has become synonymous with Roman Catholic ethics. Though its principal source and advocacy are in the Order of the Jesuits, the whole Church of Rome has by its tacit acceptance of this doctrine become iden- tified with it.
Definition. — Probabilism designates, in the domain of morals, an object so comprehensive, and including so many different branches, that we shall scarcely he able to delineate it here, even in its fundamental features. In order to define it we must depart from that moral idea which is the centre of the domain in which it moves: this centre i- the certitudt and firm conviction of the moral subject about the legitimacy of hi- acts. It is the opposite of this subjective consciousness w hich forms the object of all probabilistic questions. A- the ground of the doctrine, it is assumed, then, that in hu- man actions absolute certainty is not always attainable as to their lawfulness or unlawfulness. Short of this certainty, the intellect passes through the Btages of "doubt" and of "probability." Probability is a gtate of consciousness intermediate between certitude and in- certitude, but approaching more or Less to certitude, without reaching it entirely. Consciousness, in the state of probability, has risen aboi e incertitude. Doubt is a wavering state between two judgments, between negation and affirmation of the goodness or permissibil- ity of an action; it excludes everj positive approbation, every positive consent, every permanent decision in fa- vor of either term of the moral antithesis. Probability has pass,,! this uncertain wavering; it does not move hesitatingly to and fro; it has found a point of support. though the latter may not be absolutely trustworthy. In const quence, a more or less positive decision in favor of one or the other term of the question is possible. Such a decision must not originate in any subjective whim: it inn-t he founded on sufficient objectivi rea- sons. This v.i\es iis the true idea of the probabk COfl-
sciena : " Probabile est id quod probari potest, hoe i -t. ■ I 1 rationibus nititur." We may, then, define proba- bility in matters ,,| conscience thus: it is the decision or consent of conscience in regard to the moral permis-
PROBABILISM
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PROBABILISM
sibility of an action, a decision founded on sufficient reasons, but not excluding all misgivings to the con- trary. To the probable conscience, then, corresponds, as its foundation, the probable opinion (opinio probabilis). An opinion as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an action is the more probable the stronger the reasons on which it rests. These reasons are either intrinsic, a part of the thing itself and its objective nature, or ex- trinsic, owing their weight to human authorities. The extrinsic probability of an opinion contents itself with the repute and confidence enjoyed by the authorities which support it, while the intrinsic probability en- deavors to conceive the rational foundation of the opin- ion in question. But whichever of these forms proba- bility may assume, it can never be at variance with the decisions and doctrines of the Church. Absence of in- trinsic and extrinsic contradictions is the negative con- dition of probability. To establish true and real proba- bility (probabilitas vera), a positive element is required, to wit, a more or less evident accord with the objective law, either with its spirit or with its more or less clearly expressed dispositions. It results from the nature of opinion that a variety and diversity of opinions be con- ceived, which, in regard to their legitimacy, are of equal or unequal value. Moreover, in the conflict of views another element will arise as to their compara- tive '•safety;" that is, the greater or less danger of moral culpability which they involve; and this greater or less moral "safety" of a view may or may not co- incide with its greater or less "probability." Hence the gradual scale of probable opinions, the highest de- gree being the opinio probabilissima, but the opinio tenuitw probabilis being entirely excluded. The as- cending degrees of the concurrent probable opinions are marked by the opinio mere probabilis, ceque probabilis, and probabttior.
The doctrine of probabilism is founded upon these distinctions. It is taught, with some variations, by four different schools, all of which agree in professing that it is lawful, in certain cases, to act upon opinions which are merely probable. These four schools of probabilism are called : Probabilism Simple, ^Equiprobabilism, Proba- bUiorism (from probabilior, more probable), and Tutior- ism (from tutior, more safe). The first holds that it is lawful to act upon any probable opinion, no matter how slight its probability. The second requires that the opinion shall be " solidly probable," but holds that, pro- vided it be really probable, it is lawful to act upon it, even though the conflicting opinion should be equally probable. The third narrows much more the limits of *hat is allowed in the conflict of probable opinions, and only permits action on the more probable of the two; but permits this even when the less probable adverse opinion is the "more safe." The fourth requires that in all cases the more safe opinion shall be followed, even when the less safe opinion is much the more probable. The extreme rigorism which the last class requires has caused its division into absolute and mollified tutiorism. "By the certainty of an opinion," says Fuchs, "we are to understand the more or less considerable remoteness of the danger of sin, or of error, or of encroachment on other persons' rights. The more an opinion removes him who chooses it for his guide from the danger of actual sin, the more certain it is. The opinio tutior is that which declares that an action is not allowed ; the opinio minus tufa is that which asserts the legitimacy of the action in question. As the being allowed and the not being allowed of an action stand together in the same relation as liberty and law, it may be said that in the first case liberty, in the second law, is favored (li- bertati favet, legi favet)."