To begin with, divorce (in the legal sense) was regarded as a privilege accorded only to Israel, not to the Gentiles. [4907] [4908] On the question: what constituted lawful grounds of divorce, the Schools were divided. Taking their departure from the sole ground of divorce mentioned in Deut. xxiv. 1: a matter of shame [literally, nakedness],' the School of Shammai applied the expression only to moral transgressions, [4909] and, indeed, exclusively to unchastity. [4910] It was declared that, if a woman were as mischievous as the wife of Ahab, or [according to tradition] as the wife of Korah, it were well that her husband should not divorce her, except it be on the ground of adultery. [4911] At the same time this must not be regarded as a fixed legal principle, but rather as an opinion and good counsel for conduct. The very passages, from which the above quotations are made, also afford only too painful evidence of the laxity of views and practices current. And the Jewish Law unquestionably allowed divorce on almost any grounds; the difference being, not as to what was lawful, but on what grounds a man should set the Law in motion, and make use of the absolute liberty which it accorded him. Hence, it is a serious mistake on the part of Commentators to set the teaching of Christ on this subject by the side of that of Shammai.
But the School of Hillel proceeded on different principles. It took the words, matter of shame' in the widest possible sense, and declared it sufficient ground for divorce if a woman had spoiled her husband's dinner. [4912] [4913] Rabbi Akiba thought, that the words, [4914] if she find no favour in his eyes,' implied that it was sufficient if a man had found another woman more attractive than his wife. All agreed that moral blame made divorce a duty, [4915] and that in such cases a woman should not be taken back. [4916] According to the Mishnah, [4917] if they transgressed against the Law of Moses or of Israel. The former is explained as implying a breach of the laws of tithing, of setting apart the first of the dough, and of purification. The latter is explained as referring to such offences as that of going in public with uncovered head, of spinning in the public streets, or entering into talk with men, to which others add, that of brawling, or of disrespectfullyspeaking of her husband's parents in his presence. A troublesome, [4918] or quarrelsome wife might certainly be sent away; [4919] and ill repute, or childlessness (during ten years) were also regarded as valid grounds of divorce. [4920]
Incomparably as these principles differ from the teaching of Christ, it must again be repeated, that no real comparison is possible between Christ and even the strictest of the Rabbis, since none of them actually prohibited divorce, except in case of adultery, nor yet laid down those high eternal principles which Jesus enunciated. But we can understand how, from the Jewish point of view, tempting Him,' they would put the question, whether it was lawful to divorce a wife for every cause.' [4921] Avoiding their cavils, the Lord appealed straight to the highest authority - God's institution of marriage. He, Who at the beginning [4922] [from the first, originally, {hebrew}] [4923] had made them male and female, had in the marriage-relation joined them together,' to the breaking of every other, even the nearest, relationship, to be one flesh' - that is, to a union which was unity. Such was the fact of God's ordering. It followed, that they were one - and what God had willed to be one, man might not put asunder. Then followed the natural Rabbinic objection, why, in such case, Moses had commanded a bill of divorcement. Our Lord replied by pointing out that Moses had not commanded divorce, only tolerated it on account of their hardness of heart, and in such case commanded to give a bill of divorce for the protection of the wife. And this argument would appeal the more forcibly to them, that the Rabbis themselves taught that a somewhat similar concession had been made [4924] by Moses in regard to female captives of war, as the Talmud has it, on account of the evil impulse.' [4925] But such a separation, our Lord continued, had not been provided for in the original institution, which was a union to unity. Only one thing could put an end to that unity - its absolute breach. Hence, to divorce one's wife (or husband) while this unity lasted, and to marry another, was adultery, because, as the divorce was null before God, the original marriage still subsisted - and, in that case, the Rabbinic Law would also have forbidden it. The next part of the Lord's inference, that whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery,' is more difficult of interpretation. Generally, it is understood as implying that a woman divorced for adultery might not be married. But it has been argued, [4926] that, as the literal rendering is, whoso marrieth her when put away,' it applies to the woman whose divorce had just before been prohibited, and not, as is sometimes thought, to a woman divorced [under any circumstances].' Be this as it may, the Jewish Law, which regarded marriage with a woman divorced under any circumstances as unadvisable, [4927] absolutely forbade that of the adulterer with the adulteress. [4928]