but it does violence to the force of the word φύσις, which means simply nature, and not either holy or corrupt nature. The idea of moral character may be implied in the context, but is not expressed by the word. When we say, ‘a man is by nature kind,’ it is indeed implied that his nature is benevolent, but na- ture does not signify ‘natural benevolence.’ Thus when it is said, men are ‘ by nature corrupt,’ or, ‘ by nature the children of wrath,’ all that is asserted is that they are born in that condition.
Others take φύσις to mean in this place simply dis- position, character, inward state of mind; very much as we often use the word heart. According to this view, the word means not guod nascenti inest, sed quod consuetudo in naturam vertit. The sense then is: ‘ We, as well as others are, as to our inward disposition or state of mind, children of wrath.’ All the expressions quoted by Clericus and other advocates of this inter- pretation, are really proofs that the word φύσις has not the signification which they assign to it. When it is said that Barbarians are by nature rapacious, the Sy- rians by nature fickle, the Lacedemonians taciturn, more is meant than that such is the actual character of these people. The characteristic trait asserted of them is referred to what is innate or natural. In other words φύσις does not mean, in such cases, simply dis- position, but innate disposition.
Still more remote from the proper meaning of the terms is the interpretation which renders φύσει truly, really. ‘This is substituting an idea implied in the