I. From reason itself ; for, although in man's original con- dition reason doubtless was a sufficient guide, yet reason itself teaches us (1.) that man's intellectual and moral nature is disor- dered and not capable of perfectly fulfilling its original functions. (2.) That man's relations to God are complicated by guilt and alienation, and that the light of nature discovers no remedy for men in this state.
11. The human heart universal craves such revelation from G-od, and has always manifested its readiness to receive even counterfeits of one in the absence of the true.
III. Keason has never, in the entire course of human history, availed to afford man religious comfort and certainty, and to lead him in the way of moral rectitude. — 1 Cor. i., 20, 21. Kevela- tion has. Both have been tried upon a wide scale, the one has proved sufficient, the other has failed.
IY. The highest prophets of reason are not agreed among themselves ; no two prominent rationalists agree as to what the all sufficient and universal religious teaching of reason is. Their mutual inconsistency demonstrates the worthlessness of then com- mon principle.
II. What is the distinction between reason and faith, and what in the legitimate use of reason in the sphere of religion ?
The general definition of faith is, " assent to the truth upon the exhibition of its appropriate evidence/' (see Chapter on Faith.)
46 THEOLOGY AND ITS SOURCES.
This assent in many of its modes is an act of the understanding alone, and in all cases it involves the action of the understanding, working concurrently with the will (or heart). But when we contrast faith and reason as mutually exclusive, then we define reason to be man's natural faculty of reaching the truth, includ- ing his understanding , heart, conscience, and experience, acting under natural circumstances, and without any supernatural as- sistance. And we define faith, on the other hand, to be the assent of the mind to truth, upon the testimony of God, conveying knowl- edge to us through supernatural channels. As to the authority and legitimate use of reason in the sphere of theology, Protest- ants admit,
I. That reason is the original and fundamental revelation of God to man.
II. Keason is therefore involved and presupposed in every other revelation God will ever give to man. The Scriptures ad- dress us as rational creatures, and to the irrational they are no more a revelation than light is to the blind.
III. God can not even be supposed to reveal any thing which contradicts reason, acting legitimately within her own province. For then (1.) would God, who speaks first in reason, contradict himself, and (2.) faith would be impossible. To believe is to as- sent to a thing as true. To see a thing to be contrary to reason is to see it not to be true. These opposite states of mind can not concur at the same time.
But, on the other hand, Protestants maintain that it is essen- tial for us to settle definitely the limits of the office of reason with regard to divine things.
I. It is self-evident that there is a total difference between a thing being above reason, and its being clearly contrary to reason, acting legitimately in its own sjDhere. The ignorant boor has no right to measure the philosopher by his standard ; and much less, of course, has the philosopher a right to measure God by his. Many things are claimed to be contrary to reason which only ap- pear to be such because of our ignorance. " Humility becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation but of reason."
II. Human reason utterly fails to grasp the idea of the in- finite, or to understand the relation of the infinite to the finite. From this universal incapacity springs the mystery which attends
TRUE OFFICE OF EEASON. 47
so many of the revelations and providential dispensations of the infinite God. Hence the insolvable nature of such questions as the origin of evil, divine foreknowledge, foreordination, and concurrent providence with relation to the free agency of man, etc., etc.
III. Hence it follows that reason can not he the measure of our faith ; we must believe, and that rationally, much that we can not understand. We must use reason to reach the knowledge of what God means by his words, and what he would have us be- lieve. But to understand the meaning of words is one thing, and to understand how the thing we believe exists in all of its rela- tions, is entirely a different thing. We believe ten thousand things with respect to the phenomena of our earthly life that we can not understand ; how much more may we do so rationally with respect to the information conveyed to us by a supernatural revelation concerning divine things.
IV. Hence it follows that reason can not be the ultimate ground of our faith ; this rests only upon the knowledge and truth of God, who speaks to us in his word. Keason established the fact that God speaks, but when we know what he says, we believe it because he says it.