(2.) It is independent, i. e., it does in no way depend upon his creatures or their actions, but solely upon his own infinite intuition of all things possible in the light of his own reason, and of all things actual and future in the light of his own eternal purpose.
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(3.) It is total and simultaneous, not successive. It is one single; indivisible act of intuition, beholding all things in them- selves, their relations and successions, as ever present.
(4.) It is perfect and essential, not relative, i. e., he knows all things directly in their hidden essences, while we know them only by their properties, as they stand related to our senses.
28. How may the objects of divine hioivledge be classified ?
1st. God himself in his own infinite being. It is evident that this, transcending the sum of all other objects, is the only ade- quate object of a knowledge really infinite.
2d. All possible objects, as such, whether they are or ever have been, or ever will be or not, seen in the light of his own in- finite reason.
3d. All things which have been, are, or will be, he compre- hends in one eternal, simultaneous act of knowledge, as ever pre- sent actualities to him, and as known to be such in the light of his own sovereign and eternal purpose.
29. What is the technical designation of the knowledge of ■ things possible, and tohat is the foundation of that knowledge ?
Its technical designation is scientia simplicis intelligently, knoivledge of simple intelligence, so called, because it is conceived by us as an act simply of the divine intellect, without any con- current act of the divine will. For the same reason it has been styled scientia necessaria, necessary knowledge, i, e., not volun- tary, or determined by will. The foundation of that knowledge is God's essential and infinitely perfect knowledge of his own omnipotence.
30. What is the technical designation of the knoivledge of things actual, lohether past, present, or future, and what is the foundation of that knowledge ?
It is called scientia visionis, knowledge of vision, and scientia libera, free knowledge, because his intellect is in this case con- ceived of as being determined by a concurrent act of his will.
The foundation of this knowledge is God's infinite knowledge of his own all-comprehensive and unchangeable eternal purpose.
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31. Prove that the knowledge of God extends to future con- tingent events.
The contingency of events in our view of them has a two-fold ground : first, their immediate causes may be by us indeterminate, as in the case of the dice ; second, their immediate cause may be the volition of a free agent. The first class are in no sense con- tingent in God's view. The second class are foreknown by him as contingent in their cause, but as none the less certain in their event.
That he does foreknow all such is certain —
1st. Scripture affirms it. — 1 Sam. xxiii., 11, 12 ; Acts ii., 23; xv., 18 ; Isa. xlvi., 9, 10.
2d. He has often predicted contingent events future, at the time of the prophecy, which the event has fulfilled. — Mark xiv., 30.
3d. God is infinite in all his perfections, his knowledge, there- fore, must (1.) be perfect, and comprehend all things future as well as past (2.) independent of the creature. He knows all things in themselves by his own light, and can not depend upon the will of the creature to make his knowledge either more cer- tain or more complete.
32. How can the foreknoivledge of God be reconciled with the freedom; of moral agents in their acts ?
The difficulty here presented is of this nature. God's foreknowl- edge is certain ; the event, therefore, must be certainly future ; if certainly future, how can the agent be free in enacting it.
In order to avoid this difficulty some theologians, on the one hand, have denied the reality of man's moral freedom, while others, on the other hand, have maintained that, God's knowl- edge being free, he voluntarily abstains from knowing what his creatures endowed with free agency will do.
We remark —
1st. God's certain foreknowledge of all future events and man's free agency are both certain facts, impregnably established by independent evidence. We must believe both, whether we can reconcile them or not.
2d. Although necessity is inconsistent with liberty, moral certainty is not, as is abundantly shown in Chapter XVIIL, question 12.
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114 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
33. What is scientia media ?