The true theory of moral certainty, on the other hand, is that the soul is a unit ; that the will is not self-determined, but that man, when he wills, is self-determined ; and that his volition is certainly determined by his own internal, rational, moral, emo- tional state at the time, viewed as a whole.
In opposition to the former theory, and in favor of the latter, we argue — 1st. That the character of the agent does certainly determine the character of his free acts, and that the certainty of an act is no,t inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in his act. — See below, question 12.
2d. The Christian doctrines of the divine foreknowledge, fore- ordination, providence, and regeneration. For the Scriptural evi- dence of these, see their respective chapters. They all show that the volitions of men are neither uncertain or indeterminate.
3d. We agree with the advocates of the opposite theory in maintaining that in every free act we are conscious that we had power to perform it, or not to perform it, as we chose. " But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise, had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been al- lowed their due weight. A man can not prefer against his prefer- ence, or choose against his choice. A man may have one prefer- ence at one time, and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time, but he can not have coexisting opposite preferences."
4th. The theory of the " self-determining power of the will" regards the will, or the mere faculty of volition, as isolated from the other faculties of the soul, as an independent agent within an agent. Now, the soul is a unit. Consciousness and Scripture alike teach us that man is the free, responsible agent. By this dissociation of the volitional faculty from the moral dispositions and desires the volitions can have no moral character. By its dissociation from the reason the volitions can have no rational
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character. Since they are not determined by the inward state of the man himself, they must be fortuitous, and beyond his control. He can not be free if his will is independent alike of his head and his heart, and he ought not to be held responsible. — See Bib. Rep., January, 1857, Art. V.
11. What are the essential conditions of moral responsi- bility ?
See above, Chapter XIV., question 7.
12. Why is a man responsible for his outward actions ; why for his volitions ; why for his affections and desires ; and prove that he is responsible for his affections ?
" A man is responsible for his outward acts, because they are determined by the will ; he is responsible for his volitions, be- cause they are determined by his own principles and feelings (desires) ; he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own and constitute his character/' — Bib. Rep., January, 1857, p. 130.
It is the teaching of Scripture and the universal judgment of men, that " a good man out of the good treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," and that a " wicked man out of the evil treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." The act derives its moral character from the state of the heart from which it springs, and a man is responsible for the moral state of his heart, whether that state be innate, formed by regenerating grace or acquired by himself, because, 1st, of the obliging nature of moral right, and the ill desert of sin ; 2d, because a man's affections and desires are himself loving or refusing that which is right. It is the judgment of all, that a profane or malignant man is to be reprobated, no matter how he became so.
13. What is the distinction between liberty and ability ?
Liberty consists in the power of the agent to will as he pleases, in the fact that the volition is determined only by the character of the agent willing. Ability consists in the power of the agent to change his own subjective state, to make himself prefer
266 FREE AGENCY.
what he does not prefer, and to act in a given case in opposi- tion to the coexistent desires and preferences of the agent's own heart.
Thus man is as truly free since the fall as before it, because he wills as his evil heart pleases. But he has lost all ability to obey the law of God, because his evil heart is not subject to that law, neither can he change it.
14. But may not an unregenerate man truly desire to obey the law of God ; and, if so, why does not that desire control his will ?