terests of his government even better than the punish- ment of each sinner in person would have done, there can, of course, be no injustice involved in the arrange- ment as far as the interests of God and his government are concerned. (c.) This vicarious suffering is an in- finite benefit to those sinners who are saved, and no disadvantage whatsoever to any who may be left to bear the penal consequences of their own sins. Therefore, if there be no injustice done to any one of the parties con- cerned, there can be no injustice in the case.
As to the second side of the objection above made, we confess that the divine administration, both as to the coming in of the curse through Adam, and as to the redemption from the curse through Christ, rests upon principles higher and grander than those embraced in the ordinary rules of human law. Our doctrine, although never contradicting reason, does not rest upon it, but upon the supernatural revelation given in the Word. But while the complete satisfaction which absolute justice finds in the vicarious sufferings of a substituted victim may transcend reason, it by no means conflicts with it; because—1. It is no part of the teaching of Scripture that sin can be imputed to any one, or its guilt be expiated by the sufferings of any one, to whom it does not truly belong. There must be, of course, in every case such a union as shall, in the unerring judg- ment of God, be a firm foundation in justice for this imputation. It is no mere mental assumption on the part of God of that which is not true in fact. On the contrary, it is a most wise and righteous recognition of the exact responsibility of each party in the relations in which he stands in the eye of law to all others. Grotius, who discussed the subject with great learn- ing and ability, and certainly with sufficient deference to the claims of reason, maintains that while it is
THE MYSTICAL UNION. 187
necessary to the essence of a penalty that it be inflicted cnarrer
‘on account of sin, it is not necessary that in every
case it should be inflicted on the person of the sinner, if only there be such a union between the person who sinned and the person who is punished as justifies the imputation.* Turretin says} that there are three kinds of union known to us which justify the imputation of sin, because they are of such a nature that, in the case of certain actions, the moral responsibility for the sin is common to all the parties involved. These are— (a) natural, as between a father and his children ; (b) moral and political, as between a king and his sub- jects ; and (c) voluntary, as between friends, and between an arraigned criminal and his sponsor. Now the union of Christ with his people rests on stronger ground than any of these considered alone. It is, as we have seen, voluntary upon his part, who spontaneously assumed all the obligations he bore. But it was, moreover, the eter- nal and sovereign ordinance of the three Divine Persons in council, whose behests are the foundation of all law, of all rights, and of all obligations. If it be a revealed fact that such a union subsists on such grounds, it is surely futile for a mortal to claim that it is a pure mental fiction, and that the judicial action that proceeds upon it is unjust. 2. Providence constantly, as a matter of fact, proceeds upon principles which appear to be identical with that upon which the substitution of Christ in the place of sinners ultimately rests. God, as the Creator, Father, and Guardian of the human family, acting for its advantage, placed the moral probation of the whole race in the conduct of Adam, the natural head
* Defensio F. C. De Satisfactione Christi, chap. iv. See also “ The Grotian Theory of the Atonement,” translated from the German of Dr. F. C. Baur. Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. ix., p. 259.
t Locus 9, Ques. 9,
XIII.
188 THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.