In this first proposition, two things are to be distinctly pondered, viz.
1. The nature ) c ,, , a r^ • • i t of the soul.
Or, what it is, and from whence it came.
I. The first thing which arrests our thoughts, and requires their attention and exercise, is the nature of the soul, or what kind of being it is.
Those that are most curiously inquisitive into all other beings, and put nature upon the rack to make her confess her secrets, are in the mean time found shamefully slight and negligent in the study of themselves. Few there are [that can prevail with themselves to sit down and think close to such questions as these. What manner of being is this soul of mine f whence came it ? why was it ii fused into this body ? and where must it abide, when death has dislodged it out of this frail tabernacle? There is a natural aversationin man to such exercises of thought as these, although in the whole universe of beings in this lower world, a more noble creature is not to be found *.
The soul is the most wonderful and astonishing piece of divine
* Therefore they who at any time have disputed concerning the soul, must be reckoned to have disputed not of a vain thing, that has nothing but a name, but about a very weighty subject, of the greatest moment, than which nothing under heaven is more excellent. Zanck. on the soul.
A TREATISE OF THE SOUL OF MAX. 495
workmanship ; it is no hyperbole to call it the breath of God, the beauty of men, the wonder of angels, and the envy of devils. One soul is of more value than all the bodies in the world.
The nature of it is so spiritual and sublime, that it cannot be per- fectly known by the most acute and penetrating understanding, as- sisted in the search by all the aid philosophy can contribute.
It is not my design in this discourse to treat of the several faculties and powers of the soul, or to give you the rise, natures, or numbers of its affections and passions : but I shall confine my discourse to its general nature and original. And seeing " none can so well discover " the nature of it, as he who is the author of it," as Tertullian * speaks, I therefore justly expect the best light from his words, though I will not neglect any other aid he is pleased elsewhere to afford.
•f* The soul is variously denominated from its several powers and offices, as the sea from the several shores it washes. I will not spend time about the several names by which it is known to us in scripture, but give you that description of it, with which my un- derstanding is most satisfied, which take thus :
The soul of man is a vital, spiritual, and immor- tal substance, endowed with an understanding', will, The description and various affections ; created with an inclination of the soul. to the body, and hifused thereinto by the Lord,
In this description we have the two general parts into which I distributed this discourse : viz. its general nature, and divine ori- ginal. The nature of the soul is expressed to us in these following terms.
I. // is a substance.
That is to say, not a quality, nor an accident inhering in another being, or subject; as whiteness doth in the snow: but a being by X itself. Qualities and accidents have no existence of their own, but require another being, or subject to their existence ; but the soul of man is a substantial being of itself, which will evidently ap- pear upon the following grounds.
(1.) Because it is, in a strict and proper sense, created by God, " He formeth, or createth the spirit in man,1' Zech. xii. 1. To
• Si quid de anima certandum est, ad Dei regulas dirigat • certe nullum alium potiorerto anima demonstrationem, quant Auctorcm. Tertul. de anima, &c.
f As it quickens the body, it is called aninin, i. c. the life ; as it exerts act-; of the will, it is called animus, i. e. power of volition ; as it is the subject of knowledge, it is called the mind ; when it recollects, it is called the memory; when it judges right, it is called reason ; us it produces breathing, it is called spirit. Isidor. Etym. v. 5.
\ The soul is a being by itself, i. e. it dues not exist in any object as a part or form of it, depending on it, as to its being, CoUeg. Conimb. in lib. 1 1.
496 A TREATISE OF THE SOUL OF MAN*.
him we are advised to " commit it, as to a faithful Creator," 1 Pet. it. 19. The substantial nature of the soul is implied in the very notion of its creation ; " for whatsoever is created, is a substance, an " ens par se *. Accidents are not said to be created, but con- " created ;" the crasis of humours and results of matter are not sub- stances created, but things rising in a natural way from created substances. They flow from, and as to their essence, depend upon pre-existent matter ; but the soul was created out of nothing, and infused into the body after it was formed and organized ; which evidenceth its substantial nature.
(2.) This evidenceth the soul to be a substance ; that it can, and doth exist, and subsist by itself alone, when separated from the body by death, Luke xxiii. 43. " To-day shalt thou, (i. e. thy soul) be " with me in paradise," and Mat. x. 20. " Fear not them that kill " the body, but cannot kill the soul." Were the soul but an acci- dent, a quality, or a result, he that kills the body must needs kill the soul too ; as he that casts a snowball into the fire, must needs destroy the whiteness with the snow. Accidents fail and perish with their subjects : but seeing it is plain in these and many other scriptures, the soul doth not fail with the body; nothing can be more plain and evident, than that it is of a substantial nature.
When the Spaniards came first among the poor Indians, they thought the horse and his rider to be one creature ; as many ig- norant ones think the soul and body of man to be nothing but breath and body : whereas indeed, they are two distinct creatures, as vastly different in their natures as the rider and his horse, or the bird and his cage. While the man is on horseback, he moves according to the motion of the horse ; and while the bird is in- caged, he eats and drinks, and sleeps, and hops and sings in his cage. But if the horse fail and die under his rider, or the cage be broken, the man can go on his own feet, and the bird enjoy itself as well, yea, better in the open fields and woods, than in the cage ; neither depend, as to being, or action, on the horse or cage.
(3.) Both scripture and philosophy consent in this, that the soul is the chief, most noble, and principal part of man, from which the whole man is, and ought to be denominated. So Gen. xlvi. 26. " All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt," i. e. all the persons ; as the Latins say, tot capita, so many heads or persons. The apostle, in 2 Cor. v. 8. seems to exclude the body from the notion of personality, when he saith, We are willing rather to be absent
* Quicquid a Deo proprie crcatum est ; accidentia cnim non dicuntur creari, sed Con- or ear i. Polani Synt. p. 519.