1. It hath a freedom and liberty ; it cannot be compelled and forced : Coaction is repugnant to its very nature *. In this it differs from the understanding, that the understanding is wrought upon necessarily, but the will acts spontaneously. This liberty of the will respects the choice, or refusal of the means for attaining those ends it prosecutes, according as it finds them more or less condu- cive thereunto. The liberty of the will must be understood to be in things natural, which are within its own proper sphere, not in things supernatural. It can move, or not move the body, as it pleases, but it cannot move towards Christ, in the way of faith, as it pleaseth ; it can open or shut the hand or eye at its pleasure, but not the heart. True, indeed, it is not compelled, or forced to turn to God by supernatural grace, but in a way suitable to its nature, it is determined and drawn to Christ, Psal. ex. 3. It is drawn by a mighty power, and yet runs freely ; Cant. i. 4. " Draw me, and " I will run after thee."
Efficacious grace, and victorious delight, is a thing very differ- ent from compulsive force. " Pelagius (as a late f author speaks) " at first gave all to nature, acknowledged no necessity of divine " grace ; but when this proud doctrine found little countenance, " he called nature by the name of grace ; and when that deceit " was discovered, he acknowledged no other grace but outward " instruction, or the benefit of external revelation, to discourse, " and put men in mind of their duty. Being yet driven farther, " he acknowledged the grace of pardon ; and before a man could " do any thing acceptably, there was a necessity of the remission of " sin, and then he might obey God perfectly. But that not suf- " ficing, he acknowledged another grace, viz. the example of " Christ, which doth both secure our rule and encourage our " practice. And last of all, his followers owned some kind of in- " ternal grace, but they made that to consist in some iliumination " of the understanding, or moral persuasion, by probable argu- " ments, to excite the will, and this not absolutely necessary, but
* EXsvQzga ejsff/a avro voayiag. i. e. It hath a free liberty of action. Zen*. ■j Dr. Manton in Psal. cxii. v. 56.
A TREATISE OF THE SOUL OF MAN. 507
" only for facilitation, as a horse to a journey, which otherwise a " man might go on foot. Others grant the secret influences of " God's grace, but make the will of man a co-ordinate cause with " God, namely, that God doth propound the object, hold forth in- " ducing considerations ; give some remote power and assistance ; " but still there is an indifferency in the will of man, to accept or " refuse, as liketh him best." Thus have they been forced to quit and change their ground ; but still the pride of nature will not let men see the necessity of divine efficacious influences upon the will, and the consistency thereof with natural liberty.
(2.) Its dignity in its dominion, as wrell as in its liberty. The will hath an empire, and sceptre belonging to it ; yea, a double empire, for it rules,
B f\. Despo- \ 1. Over •| J ticum. \ solute
&\ 2. Poliii- i 2. Over J* V cum. ) impei
B f\. Despo- \ 1. Over the body, imperio despotico, by way of ab- te command, the other powers and passions of the soul, imperio politico, by wray of suasion.
(1.) The will, like an absolute sovereign*, reigns over the body, i. e. its external members by way of absolute command. It saith, as the centurion did, I am in authority, and God hath put the many members of the body in subjection to me ; I say to one, move, and it moves ; to another, stop, and it stops ; and to a third, do this, and it doth it. The obsequious members of the body, like so many servants, have their eyes waiting on the imoe- rial commands of the will, and it is admirable to behold with what dispatch and speed they execute its commands, as if their obedient motions were rather concomitant than subsequent acts to the will's mandates. Let it but command to have the windows of the body, open or shut, and it is done in a moment, in the twink of an eye ; and so for the rest of the external senses and members, they pay it most ready obedience. Yet when I say, the will hath a despotical, and absolute sovereignty over the members, it must be understood with a double limitation. First, They are only at its beck for use and service ; it can use them whilst well and rightly disposed ; but it cannot perpetuate them, or restore them when indisposed. If the soul will the health and life of the body never so intensely and vehemently, it cannot keep off death one moment the longer from it. And, Secondly, Its sovereignty no way intrenches upon, nor interferes with the dominion of providence* over the members of
* Man acts not by necessity of nature, but freely, namely in a rational way, that is by way of command ; this command requires the final determination of the practical understanding, and while the efficacy of the command stands, the will is moved freely. Camel, de votuii. p. 50.
A TREATISE OF THE SOUL OF MAN.
the body, and the various motions of them. God hath reserved a sovereign, negative voice to himself, whatever decrees the will passes. Jeroboam stretches out his hand against the man of God to smite him ; but God puts a remora in the very instant to the loco-motive faculty, that though he would never so fain, he could not pull in his hand again to him, 1 Kings xiii. 4. The will commands the ser- vice of the tongue, and charges it to deliver faithfully such or such words, in which, it may be, the ruin of good men may be imported ; and when it comes to do its office, the tongue faulters ; and contrary to the command of the will, drops some word that discovers and defeats the design of the will, according to that in Job xii. 20. " He removeth away the speech of the trusty." This is its despotical and sovereign power over the external members of the body.
(2.) It hath a political power over the faculties and passions of the soul, not by way of absolute command, but by way of suasion and in- sinuation. Thus it can oft times persuade the understanding and thoughts to lay by this or that subject, and apply themselves to the study of another. It can bridle and restrain the affections and pas- sions, but yet it hath no absolute command over the inner, as it hath over the outward man. Its weakness and inability to govern the inner man appears in two things, more especially remarkable, viz. 1. It cannot, with all its power and skill command and fetch off the thoughts from some subjects, which are set on, at some times, with extraordinary weight upon the soul. However, the thoughts may obsequiously follow its beck at some times, yea, for the most part; yet there are cases and seasons, in which its authority and persuasions cannot disengage one thought.