^ Euseb. Eccl. Hist., lib. ii. cap. 1.
^ ' Opus bonum optime factum mortale peccatum est' ; et paulo post, ' Omne opus justi damnabile est, et mortale peccatum, si iudicio Dei iudicetur.' — Luther in Assert., arts. 31, 32, 35, 36.
^ ' Omne virtutis nostrse meritum est vitium, et omnis humana justitia injustitia est si stricte judicetur.' — Gir.r/. Moral. 9, caps. 1, 14.
276 AN EXPOSITION, WITH NOTES, [JaS. III. 2.
wholly passive ; ^ and though God doth not take away the power of resisting, yet he bridlcth it, and suspcndeth it, that corruption cannot put forth' itself, hut lietli liid in its own root. Besides, in some actions, which are merely natural, as in walking a step or two, there is not the least provocation to draw forth sin ; and therefore I cannot but justly condemn that unnecessary rigour in some, who say, that a renewed man in every action, whether moral, civil, or natural, be it but the walking of two or three steps, dotli actually sin ; a fond nicety, which, under the colour of a deeper humility, destroyetli true humilia- tion. We need not make man moi'e guilty ; it is enough to humble us that ' in many things we offend all.' But the devil loveth to cheat men of true humility by that which is affected and strained ; and when fancy inventeth supposed crimes, conscience is the less troubled for those which are real ; curiosity being a kind of excuse for due remorse. (3.) Those actions are not acceptable with God for their own sakes ; partly because though they are pure, or free from sin, yet they are not perfect ; they might be more holy. And partly because they are done by a person "that hath a corrupt nature, and is stained with the guilt of other actual sins, the least of which renders him obnoxious to the curse of the whole law, James ii. 10. So that these actions also need a mediator ; and, as the apostle saith, where we ' know nothing by our- selves, we are not thereby justified,' 1 Cor. iv. 4 ; or as it is. Job ix. 3, ' If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thou- sand.' For one such innocent action, there are a thou.sand stained and polluted. Another question may be, whether there be not some sins which in their own nature are so foul that a child of God can- not fall into them ? I answer — (1.) There are some gross corruptions which are very contrai-y to grace, fxida/j-ara tov KoafMov, ' corruptions of the world,' 2 Peter ii. 20, sins that stink in the no.strils of nature ; therefore the apostle saith, ' The lusts of the flesh are manifest,' Gal. v. 19, that is, to sense and reason ; as adultery, drunkenness, (fee, wh.ich nature hath branded with marks of shame and contempt ; into these a child of God may fall, though rarely and very seldom. We have instances of Noah's drunkenness, Lot's incest, and David's adultery ; therefore may conclude, that the children of God do not only sin freely in thought, but sometimes foully in act ; however, not usually, not but upon special temptation : they are not ad pocula faciles, given to women, or to wine. The usual piactice is a note of God's hatred : ' A whore is a deep ditch, and he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein,' Prov. xxii. 14. These sins, therefore, are not of usual in- cidence, ns wrath, and worldliness, and pride are. (2.) There are other sins which are extremely contraiy to nature itself, as Sodom's bestiality, (fee, into which a renewed man cannot fall ; partly for the great dis- honour such a fact would reflect upon religion ; partly because it is a note of God's tradition, or giving up a man or woman to sin, Rom. i. 2(J, 27. These things are so far from being practised by saints, that they are not to be named amongst them, Eph. v. 3.
' 'Deus in ipso regeneration is opera adeo potenter in voluntatem agit, ut actualiter rcHistendi potentia proxima pro illo tempore Buspcndatur ; euiotam autem et in actu primo positam resistendi potentiam non quidem funditus extirpat, sed in sua amara radice delitessere permittit.' — Thcol. Brilan. in Hynod. Dord., Art. de Convcrsione.
JaS. 111. 2.j UPON THE EriSTLE OF JAMES. 277
If any man offend not in ivord, the same is a -perfect man. — Here is the second iugument; bridling the tongue is a note of some per- fection and effectual progress in grace. ' Offend not in word,' that is, 6i)eaketh only a known truth, and that seasonably, charitably, without vanity, or folly, or obscenity, or rash oaths, as Gregory Nysseni fully expoundeth it. ' Is a perfect man.' You may take the words as a supposition. If any man avoid the evils of the tongue, I will make bold to call him a perfect man, such another as is not found among mortals. Thus we say often, when we propose an unlikely practice, He that could do this were a perfect man indeed. Or you may take it positively and assertively, and so it is another argument against supercilious censures. ' If you offend not in word, you are perfect,' that is, upright, sincere ; those that are so, because they do not divide and baulk with God, are expressed by the term 'perfect. Or else perfect is put here for some ripeness and growth in Christianity. In the Jewish discipline there were two sorts of persons — dcrKrjTal, heghmers, that did exercise themselves in virtuous actions and endeavours ; then there were others, whom Philo calleth reXetou?, 'perfect ; they were those that had attained to somewhat, and made some progress in the matters learned. Thus perfect is taken, 1 Cor. ii. 6, ' We speak wisdom among those that are perfect.' However weaklings ai'e taken with toys, yet grown, mortified Christians will discern wisdom and sublimity in the plain preaching of Christ crucified. And this sense maybe accommodated to this place: He that bridleth his tongue is not aaKr]Ti]^^ a beginner or learner, one that trietli experiments in religion, but reXeio?, a jjerfect man, one that hath made some towardly progress.