Bnt yet it must be said, that they are neither severally nor jointly, though in the highest degree, either necessary dispositions, prepara- tions, previous congruities in a way of merit, nor conditions of our justification. For, —
[1.] They are not co?^rf^i^o?^s of justification. For where one thing is the condition of another, that other thing must follow the fulfilling of that condition, otherwise the condition of it it is not; but they may be all found where justification doth not ensue: v.'herefore, there is no covenant, promise, or constitution of God, making them to be such conditions of justification, though, in their o^vn nature, they may be subservient unto what is required of us with respect thereunto; but a certain infallible connection with it, by virtue of
CAUSES AND OBJECT OF FAITH. 79
any promise or covenant of God (as it is with faith), they have not. And other condition, but what is constituted and made to be so by divine compact or promise, is not to be allowed ; for otherwise, con- ditions might be endlessly multiplied, and all things, natural as well as moral, made to be so. So the meat we eat may be a condition of justification. Faith and justification are inseparable; but so are not justification and the things we now insist upon, as experience doth evince. *
[2.] Justification may be, where the outiuard acts and duties men- tioned, proceeding from convictions under the conduct of temporary faith, are not. For Adam was justified without them; so also were the converts in the Acts, chap, ii., — for what is reported concerning them is all of it essentially included in conviction, verse 87 ; and so likewise was it with the jailer, Acts xvi. 30, 81 ; and as unto many of them, it is so with most that do believe. Therefore, they are not conditions; for a condition suspends the event of that whereof it is a condition. ,
[3.] They are not formal dispositions unto justification; because it consisteth not in the introduction of any new form or inherent quality in the soul, as hath been in part already declared, and shall yet afterward be more fully evinced. Nor, — [4.] Are they ono^^al pre- parations for it ; for being antecedent unto faith evangelical, no man can have any design in them, but only to " seek for righteousness by the works of the law," which is no preparation unto justification. All discoveries of the righteousness of God, with the soul's adherence unto it, belong to faith alone. There is, indeed, a repentance which accompanieth faith, and is included in the nature of it, at least radically. This is required unto our justification. But that legal repentance which precedes gospel faith, and is without it, is neither a disposition, preparation, nor condition of our justification.
In brief, the order of these things may be observed in the dealing of God with Adam, as was before intimated. And there are three degrees in it: — [1.] The opening of the eyes of the sinner, to see the filth and guilt of sin in the sentence and curse of the law applied unto his conscience, Rom. vii. 9, 10. This effects in the mind of the sinner the things before mentioned, and puts him upon all the duties that spring from them. For persons on their first convictions, ordi- narily judge no more but that their state being evil and dangerous, it is their duty to better it ; and that they can or shall do so accord- ingly, if they apply themselves thereunto. But all these things, as to a protection or deliverance from the sentence of the law, are no better than fig-leaves and hiding. [2.] Ordmarily, God by his provi- dence, or in the dispensation of the word, gives life and power unto this work of the law in a peculiar manner; in answer unto the charge
80 ON JUSTIFICATION.
which he gave unto Adam after his attempt to hide himself. Hereby the " mouth of the sinner is stopped," and he becomes, as thoroughly- sensible of his guilt before God, so satisfied that there is no relief or deliverance to be expected from any of those ways of sorrow or duty that he hath put himself upon. [3.] In this condition it is a mere act of sovereign grace, without any respect unto these things fore- going, to call the sinner unto believing, or faith in the promise unto the justification of life. This is God's order; yet so as thkt what precedeth his call unto faith hath no causality thereof
3. The next thing to be inquired into is the proper object of jus- tifying faith, or of true faith, in its ofiice, w^ork, and duty, with respect unto our justification. And herein we must first consider what we cannot so well close withal. For besides other differences that seem to be about it (which, indeed, are but different explanations of the same thing for the substance), there are two opinions which are looked on as extremes, the one in an excess, and the other in defect. The first is that of the Roman church, and those who comply with them therein. And this is, that the object of justifying faith, as such, is all divine verity, all divine revelation, whether written in the Scripture or delivered by tradition, represented unto us by the au- thority of the church. In the latter part of this description we are not at present concerned. That the whole Scripture, and all the parts of it, and all the truths, of what sort soever they be, that are contained in it, are equally the object of faith in the discharge of its office in our justification, is that which they maintain. Hence, as to the nature of it, they cannot allow it to consist in any thing but an assent of the mind. For, supposing the whole Scripture, and all con- tained in it, — laws, precepts, promises, threatenings, stories, prophecies, and the like, — to be the object of it, and these not as containing in them things good or evil unto us, but under this formal considera- tion as divinely revealed, they cannot assign or allow any other act of the mind to be required hereunto, but assent only. And so con- fident are they herein, — namely, that faith is no more than an assent unto divine revelation, — as that Bellarmine, in opposition unto Calvin, who placed knowledge in the description of justifying faith, affirms that it is better defined by ignorance than by knowledge.