If we may introduce words into religion nowhere used in the Scripture (as we may and must, if we design to bring light, and com- municate proper apprehensions of the things contained [in it] unto the minds of men), yet are we not to take along with them arbitrary, preconceived senses, forged either among lawyers or in the perijoa- tetical school. The use of them in the most approved authors of the language whereunto they do belong, and their common vulgar acceptation among ourselves, must determine their sense and mean- ing. It is known what confusion in the minds of men, the introduc- tion of words into ecclesiastical doctrines, of whose signification there hath not been a certain determinate rule agreed on, liath produced. So the word " merit " was introduced by some of the ancients (as is
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114 ON JUSTIFICATION.
plain from tlie design of their discourses where they use it) for im- petration or acquisition " quovis modo;" — by any means whatever. But there being no cogent reason to confine the word unto that pre- cise signification, it hath given occasion to as great a corruption as hath befiillen Christian religion. We must, therefore, make use of the best means we have to understand the meaning of this word, and what is intended by it, before we admit of its use in this case.
" Conditio," in the best Latin writers, is variously used, answering xarddraffig, rv^ri, K^/a, a/r/a, ffwdriZTj, in the Greek; that is, "status, fortuna, dignitas, causa, pactum initum." In which of these signifi- cations it is here to be understood is not easy to be determined. In common use among us, it sometimes denotes the state and quality of men, — that is, -/MrdaraGig and dt,ia ; and sometimes a valuable con- sideration for what is to be done, — that is, a/V/a or omOi^xn- But herein it is applied unto things in great variety; sometimes the principal procuring, purchasing cause is so expressed. As the condition whereon a man lends another a hundred pounds is, that he he paid it again with interest; — the condition whereon a man convey eth his land unto another is, that he receive so much money for it: so a condi- tion is a valuable consideration. And sometimes it signifies such things as are added to the principal cause, whereon its operation is suspended; — as a man bequeaths a hundred pounds unto another, on condition that he come or go to such a place to demand it. This is no valuable consideration, yet is the effect of the principal cause, or the will of the testator, suspended thereon. And as unto degrees of respect unto that whereof any thing is a condition, as to purchase, procurement, valuable consideration, necessary presence, the variety is endless. We therefore cannot obtain a determinate sense of this word condition, but from a particular declaration of what is intended by it, wherever it is used. And although this be not sufficient to exclude the use of it from the declaration of the way and manner how we are justified by faith, yet is it so to exclude the imposition of any precise signification of it, any other than is given it by the matter treated of Without this, every thing is left ambiguous and uncertain whereunto it is applied.
For instance, it is commonly said that faith and new obedience are the condition of the new covenant; but yet, because of the ambiguous signification and various use of that term (condition), we cannot certainly understand what is intended in the assertion. If no more be intended but that God, in and by the new covenant, (loth indispensably require these things of us, — that is. the restipula- tion of a good, conscience towards God, by the resurrection of Christ from the dead, in order unto his o\rii glory, and our full enjoyment of all the benefits of it, it is unquestionably true; but if it be intended
THE USE OF FAITII IN JUSTIFICATION. 115
that tliey are such a condition of the covenant as to be by us per- formed antecedently unto the participation of any grace, mercy, or privilege of it, so as that they should be the consideration and pro- curing causes of them, — that they should be all of them, as some speak, the reward of our faith and obedience, — it is most false, and not only contrary to express testimonies of Scripture, but destructive of the nature of the covenant itself. If it be intended that, these things, though promised in the covenant, and wrought in us by the grace of God, are yet duties required of us, in order unto the participation and enjoyment of the full end of the covenant in glory, it is the truth which is asserted ; but if it be said that faith and new obedience — that is, the works of righteousness which we do — are so the condition of the covenant, as that whatever the one is ordained of God as a means of, and in order to such or such an end, as justification, that the other is likewise ordained unto the same end, with the same kind of efficacy, or with the same respect unto the effect, it is expressly con- trary to the whole scope and express design of the apostle on that subject. But it will be said that a condition in the sense intended, when faith is said to be a condition of our justification, is no more but that it is " causa sine qua non;'' which is easy enough to be ap- prehended. But yet neither are we so delivered out of uncertainties into a plain understanding of what is intended; for these " causa? sine quibus non" may be taken largely or more strictly and precisely. So are they commonly distinguished by the masters in these arts. Those so called, in a larger sense, are all such causes, in any kind of efficiency or merit, as are inferior unto principal causes, and would operate noticing without them ; but in conjunction with them, have a real effective influence, physical or moral, into the production of the effect. And if we take a condition to be a " causa sine qua non" in this sense, we are still at a loss what may be its use, efficiency, or merit, with respect unto our justification. If it be taken more strictly for that which is necessarily present, but hath no causality in any kind, not that of a receptive instrument, I cannot understand how it should be an ordinance of God. For every thing that he hath ap- pointed unto any end, 'moral or spiritual, hath, by virtue of that appointment, either a symbolical instructive efficacy, or an active efficiency, or a reivai^dable condecency, with respect unto that end. Other things may be generally and remotely necessary unto such an end, so far as it partakes of the order of natural beings, which are not ordinances of God with respect thereunto, and so have no kind of causality with respect unto it, as it is moral or spiritual. So the air we breathe is needful unto the preaching of the word, and con- sequently a "causa sine qua non" thereof; but an ordinance of God with especial respect thereunto it is not. But every thing thaL he