2. It proceeds on this supposition, that the laiu, in case of sin, doth not oblige unto punishment and obedience both, so as that it is not satisfied, fulfilled, or complied withal, unless it be answered with respect unto both; for if it doth so, then the pardon of sin, which only frees us from the penalty of the law, doth yet leave it necessary that obedience be performed unto it, even all that it doth require. But this, in my judgment, is an evident mistake, and that such as doth not " establish the law, but make it void." And this I shall demonstrate: —
\i (1.) The law hath two parts or powers: — First, Its preceptive part, commanding and requiring obedience, with a promise of life an- nexed : " Do this, and live." Secondly, The sanction on supposition of disobedience, binding the sinner unto punishment, or a meet recom- pense of reward : " In the day thou sinnest thou shalt die." And every law, properly so called, proceeds on these suppositions of obe- dience or disobedience, whence its commanding and punishing power are inseparate from its nature.
(2.) This law whereof we speak was first given unto man in in- nocency, and therefore the first power of it was only in act ; it obliged only unto obedience : for an innocent person could not be obnoxious unto its sanction, which contained only an obligation unto punish- ment, on supposition of disobedience. It could not, therefore, oblige our first parents unto obedience and punishment both, seeing its obligation unto punishment could not be in actual force but on supposition of actual disobedience. A moral cause of, and motive unto, obedience it was, and had an influence into the preservation of
THE IMPUTATION OF CHRIST's OBEDIENCE. 265
man from sin. Unto that end it was said unto him, " In the day thou eatest, thou shalt surely die." The neglect hereof, and of that ruling influence which it ought to have had on the minds of our first parents, opened the door unto the entrance of sin. But it implies a contradiction, that an innocent person should be under an actual obligation unto punishment from the sanction of the law. It bound only unto obedience, as all laws, with penalties, do before their trans- gression. But, —
(3.) On the committing of sin (and it is so with every one that is guilty of sin), man came under an actual obligation unto punish- ment. This is no more questionable than whether at first he was under an obligation unto obedience. But then the question is, whether the first intention and obligation of the law unto obedience doth cease to affect the sinner, or continue so as at the same time to oblige him unto obedience and punishment, both its powers being in act towards him? And hereunto I say, —
[1.] Had the punishment threatened been immediately inflicted unto the utmost of what was contained in it, this could have been no question; for man had died immediately, both temporally and eternally, and been cast out of that state wherein alone he could stand in any relation unto the preceptive power of the law. He that is finally executed hath fulfilled the law so as that he owes no more obedience unto it.
But, [2.] God, in his wisdom and patience, hath otherwise dis- posed of things. Man is continued a " viator" stiU, in the way unto his end, and not fully stated in his eternal and unchangeable con- dition, wherein neither promise nor threatening, reward nor punish- ment, could be proposed unto him. In this condition he falls under a twofold consideration : — First, Of a guilty person, and so is obliged unto the full punishment that the law threatens. This is not denied. Second, Of a man, a rational creature of God, not yet brought unto his eternal end.
[3.] In this state, the law is the only instrument and means of the continuance of the relation between God and him. Wherefore, under this consideration, it cannot but still oblige him unto obedience, un- less we shall say that by his sin he hath exempted himself from the government of God. Wherefore, it is by the law that the rule and government of God over men is continued whilst they are in " statu \datorum ;" for every disobedience, every transgression of its rule and order, as to its commanding power, casteth us afresh and farther, under its power of obliging unto punishment.
Neither can these things be otherwise. Neither can any man liv- ing, not the worst of men, choose but judge himself, whilst he is in this world, obliged to give obedience unto the law of God, according
266 ON JUSTIFICATION.
to the notices that he hath of it by the hght of nature or otherv/ise. A wicked servant that is punished for his fault, if it be with such a punishment as yet continues his being and his state of servitude, is not by his punishment freed from an obligation unto duty, accord- ing unto the rule of it; yea, his obligation unto duty, with respect unto that crime for which he was punished, is not dissolved until his punishment be capital, and so put an end unto his state. Where- fore, seeing that by the pardon of sin we are freed only from the obligation unto punishment, there is, moreover, required unto our justification an obedience unto what the law requireth.