XII.— The progress of the dispute to the theologians of our own country- The supreme authority of divine truth- Who they are, and what kind of nien who have gone into factions about this matter— The Coryphaius ot the adversaries,_ the very illustrious Twisse-The occasion of his .publishing his opinion— The opinion of the Arminians— The effects of tne dea,th of Christ what-Twisse acknowledges punitory justice to be natm-al to God— ihe division of the dispute with Twisse— Maccovius' answers to the arguments of Twisse-The plan of our disputation, 583
XIIL-TwissE's first argument-Its answer-A trifling view of the divine attri- butes—Whether God could, by his absolute power, forgive sins with- °"^ 'If ^i'r '"^^J-'?? "A^J*^* ^'"^ P^-^ unpunished implies a contradiction ; and that twotold-What these contradictions are-Whether God may do what man may do— Whether every man may renounce his right- Whether God cannot forgive sins because of his justice— The second argument— Its answer— Distinctions of necessity-God doth no work without himself from absolute necessity- Conditional necessity— Na- tural necessity twofold-God doth not punish to the extent of his power, but to the extent of his justice— God always acts with a con- comitant liberty— An argument pf the illustrious Vossius considered- God a consummg hie," but an intellectual one-An exception of 1 wisse s-\\ hether, independent of the divine appointment, sin would merit punishment-In punishment, what things are to be considered- 1 tie relation of obedience to reward and disobedience to punishment
rmproperlJ'Ltituter^^"^°'' ^^^^^"'^ "'"''"^ ^'''^ •''''*''^ ^^ ^'''''''' XIV.— Twisse's third argunient-A dispensation with regard to the punishment ot sin what, and of what kind— The nature of punishment and its cir- cumstances-rhe instance of this learned opponent refuted-The con- siderations of rewarding and punishing ditferent— How long, and in wliat sense, God can dispense with the punishment due to sin- God the supreme governor of the Jewish polity; also, the Lord of all-Tlie fourth argument ot 1 wisse-The answer— Whether God can inflict punishment on au innocent person- In what sense God is more willing to do acts of kindness than to punish-What kind of willingness that assertion re- spects—1 he conclusion of the answer to Twisse' s principal arguments, 592
574
586
VIII CONTENTS.
Chap. Pace
XV.— The defence of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Twisse — The agreement of these very learned men in a point of the utmost importance — A vindi- cation of his ai'gument from God's liatrcd against sin — Liberalitv and justice different — The opinion of Lubbertus undeservedly charged with atheism — What kind of necessity of operation we suppose in Uod; this pointed out — The sophistical reasoning of this learned writer— How (lod is boimd to manifest any property of his nature — The reasons of LubbertiLS, and Twisse's objections to the same considei-ed— That pas- sage of the apostle, Rom. i. 32, considered and vindicated — His mode of disputing rejected — The force of the argument from Rom. i. 32 — The " righteous judgment of God," what— Our federal representative, and those represented by him, are one mystical body — An answer to Twisse's arguments — Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7; the learned writer's answer respecting that passage — A defence of the pa.ssage — Punitory justice a name of God — Whether those for whom Christ hath made satisfaction oiight to be called guilty — Ps. v. 4-6, the sense of that passage consi- dered— From these three passages the argument is one and the same — Lubbertus' argument from the definition of justice weighed — How vin- dicator3' justice is distinguished from universal — The nature of liber- ality and justice evidently different— Punishment belongs to God — In inflicting punishment, God vindicates his right— Will and necessity, whether they be opposite — The end of the defence of Lubbertus, . 595 XVI. — Piscator's opinion of this controversy — How far we assent to it — Twisse's arguments militate against it — How God punislies from a natural ne- cessity— How God is a "consuming fire" — God's right, of wliat kind — Its exercise necessary, from some thing supposed — \Vhence the obliga- tion of God to exercise it arises — Other objections of Twisse discussed, 603 XVII. — RuTiiEKFORD revicwcd — An oversight of that learned man — His opinion of punitory justice — He contends that divine justice exists in God freely — The consideration of that assertion— This learned writer and Twisso disagi-ee — His first argument— Its answer— The appointment of Christ to death twofold — The appointment of Christ to the mediatorial office an act of supreme dominion — The punishment of Christ an act of puni- tory justice — An argument of that learned man easy to answer — 'J^he examination of the same — The learned writer proves things not denied; passes over things to be denied — What kind of necessity we ascribe to God in punishing sins— A necessity upon a condition supposed — What the suppositions are upon which that necessity is founded— A differ- ence between those things wliicli are necessary by a decree and those which arc so from the divine nature — The second argument of that learned man— His obscure manner of writing pointed out — Justice and mercy dillerent in respect of their exercise — What it is to owe the good of punitory justice to the univcr.se— This learned man's third argu- ment—The answer — Whether God could forbid sin, and not under the penalty of eternal death — Concerning the modification of punishment in human courts from the divine appointment— The manner of it — What this learned author understands by the "internal court" of God — This learned author's fourth argument — All acts of grace have a re- spect to (Jhrist — His fifth argument — The answer — A dissei'tation of the various degrees of punishment — For what reason God may act un- equally with equals — Concerning the delay of punishment, and its various dispensations, . . . . . . . 607