" Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my plea- sure," Isa. xlvi. 10.
" For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the pur- pose of God according to election might stand," as Rom. ix. 11.
" The foundation of God stand- eth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his," 2 Tim. ii. 19.
" The counsel of the Lord stand- eth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations," P.--. xxxiii. 11.
Lib. Arbit.
" It is false to say that election is confirmed from everlasting,'' Rem. Apol.
"It is certain that God deter- mineth divers things which he would not, did not some act of man's will go before," Armin.
" Some decrees of God precede all acts of the will of the crea- ture, and some follow," Corv.
" Men may make their elec- tion void and frustrate," Rem. Apol.
" It is no wonder if men do sometimes of elect become repro- bate, and of reprobate, elect," Welsin.
" Election is uncertain and re- vocable, and whoever denies it overthrows the gospel," Grevinch.
" Many decrees of God cease at a certain time," Episcop.
22 A DISPLAY OF AIlMINIANISM.
S. S. Lib. Arbit.
*' My counsel shall stand, and " God Avould have all men to I will do all my pleasure," Isa. be saved, but, compelled with the xlvi. 10. stubborn malice of some, he
changeth his purpose, and will have them to perish," Armin. "I am the Lord, I change not," "As men may change them- Mal. iii. 6. selves from believers to unbeliev-
ers, so God's determination con- cerning them changeth," Rem. " With the Father of lights is " All God's decrees are not no variableiiess, neither shadow peremptory, but some condition- of turning," James i. 17; Exod. ate and changeable," Sermon at iii. 13, 14; Ps. cii. 27; 2 Tim. ii. Oxford. 13; 1 Sam. xv. 29; Isa. xiv. 27; Job xxiii. 13; Ps. cxv. 3.
CHAPTER III.
Of the prescience or foreknowledge of God, and how it is questioned and overthrown by the Arminians.
The prescience or foreknowledge of God hath not hitherto, in ex- press terms, been denied by the Arminians, but only questioned and overthi'own by consequence, inasmuch as they deny the certainty and unchangeableness of his decrees, on which it is founded. It is not a foreknowledge of all or any thing which they oppose, but only of things free and contingent, and that only to comply with their for- merly-exj)l6ded error, that the purposes of God concerning such things are temporal and mutable; which obstacle being once removed, the way is open how to ascribe the presidentship of all human actions to omnipotent contingency, and her sire free-will. Now, we call that contingent which, in regard of its next and immediate cause, before it come to pass, may be done or may be not done; as, that a man shall do such a thing to-morrow, or any time hereafter, which he may choose whether ever he will do or no. Such things as these are free and changeable, in respect of men, their immediate and second causes; but if we, as we ought to do, ^look up unto Him who foreseeth and hath ordained the event of them or their omis- sion, they may be said necessarily to come to pass or to be omitted. It could not be but as it was. Christians hitherto, yea, and heathens,^ in all things of this nature, have usually, upon their event, reflected
' James iv. 13-15. ' Ajoi I' triXihro p>ouXn, Horn; — " God's will was done."
OF THE PEESCIENCE OF GOD. 23
on God as one whose determination was passed on them from eter- nity, and who knew them long before; as the kilUng of men by the fall of a house, who might, in respect of the freedom of their own wills, have not been there. Or if a man fall into the hands of thieves, we presently conclude it was the will of God. It must be so ; he knew it before.
Divines, for distinction's sake, ^ascribe unto God a twofold know- ledge; one, intuitive or intellective, whereby he foreknoweth and seeth all things that are possible, — that is, all things that can be done by his almighty power, — without any respect to their future existence, whether they shall come to pass or no. Yea, infinite things, whose actual being eternity shall never behold, are thus open and naked unto him ; for was there not strength and power in his hand to have created another world ? was there not counsel in the storehouse of his wisdom to have created this otherwise, or not to have created it at all ? Shall we say that his providence extends itself every way to the utmost of its activity ? or can he not produce innumerable things in the world which now he doth not. Now, all these, and every thing else that is feasible to his infinite power, he foresees and knows, " scientia," as they speak, " simplicis intelligentise," by his essential knowledge.
Out ^of this large and boundless territory of things possible, God by his decrees freely detennineth what shall come to pass, and makes them future which before were but possible. After this decree, as they commonly speak, followeth, or together with it, as ^others more exactly, taketh place, that prescience of God which they call "visionis," " of vision," ^whereby he infallibly seeth all things in their proper causes, and how and when they shall come to pass. Now, these two sorts of knowledge differ, ^inasmuch as by the one God knoweth what