1 The •words "former" and "latter" evidently refer to the previous sentence, — " former " corresponding with the revealed will, " latter " with the secret will of God. The order is reversed in the first clause of tliis sentence, and i»encc the author's mean- ing might be mistaken. — Ed.
48 A DISPLAY OF ARMINIANISM.
liad nothing to do with that : but there was one to believe that if he would please God, he must let them go. Hence divers things of good use in these controversies may be collected : —
First, That God may command many things by his word which he never decreed that they should actually be performed; because, in such things, his words are not a revelation of his eternal decree and purpose, but only a declaration of some thing wherewith he is well- pleased, be it by us performed or no. In the fore-cited case he com- manded Pharaoh to let his people go, and plagued him for refusing to obey his command. Hence we may not collect that God intended the obedience and conversion of Pharaoh by this his precept, but was frustrated of his intention, — for the Scripture is evident and clear that God purposed by his disobedience to accomplish an end far different, even a manifestation of his glory by his punishment, — but only that obedience unto his commands is pleasing unto him ; as 1 Sam. xv. 22.
Secondly, That the will of God to which our obedience is required is the revealed will of God contained in his word ; whose compliance with his decree is such, that hence we learn three things tending to the execution of it: — First, That it is the condition of the word of God, and the dispensation thereof, instantly to persuade to faith and obedience. Secondly, That it is our duty by all means to aspire to the peiforraance of all things by it enjoined, and our fault if we do not. Thirdly, That God by these means will accomplish his eternal decree of saving his elect; and that he willeth the salvation of others, inasmuch as he calleth them unto the performance of the condition thereof. Now, our obedience is so to be regulated by this revealed will of God, that we may sin either by omission against its precepts or commission against its prohibitions; although by our so omitting or committing of any thing the secret will or purpose of God be ful- filled. Had Abraham disobeyed God's precept, when he was com- manded to sacrifice his son Isaac, though God's will had been accom- plislied thereby, who never intended it, yet Abraham had grievously sinned against the revealed will of God, the rule of his duty. The holiness of our actions consisteth in a conformity unto his precepts, and not imto his purposes. On this ground Gregory affirmeth,^ " That many fulfil the will of God" (that is, his intentions) " when they think to change it" (by transgressing his precepts) ; " and by resisting im- prudently, obey God's purpose." And to show how merely we in our actions are tied to this rule of our duty, St Austin^ shows how a man may do good in a thing cross to God's secret will, and evil in that which complieth with it, which he illustrates by the example of a
1 " Multi voluntatcm Dei faciunt, cum illam nituntur vitare, ct rcsistciulo imprudcn- tcr obscquuntui- diviuo consilio." — Grog. Moral., lib. vi. cap. 11.
2 Aug. Enchirid. ad Lauren., cap. ci.
WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD MAY BE RESISTED. 49
sick parent having two children, the one wicked, who desires his father's death, the other godl}', and he prays for his life. But the will of God is he shall die, agreeably to the desire of the wicked child ; and yet it is the other who hath performed his duty, and done what is pleasing unto God.
Thirdly, To return from this not unnecessary digression, that which we have now in agitation is the secret will of God, which we have before unfolded; and this it is that we charge the Arminians for affirming that it maybe resisted, — that is, that Ood may fail in hie purjjoses, come short oftvhat he earnestly intendeth, or he frustrated of his aim and end: as if, [when] he should determinately resolve the faith and salvation of any man, it is in the power of that man to make void his determination, and not believe, and not be saved. Now, it is only in cases of this nature, wherein our own free wills have an interest, that they thus limit and circumscribe the power of the Most High. In other things they grant his omnipotence to be of no less extent than others do; but in this case they are peremptory aud resolute, without any colouring or tergiversation : for whereas there is a question proposed by the apostle, Rom. ix. 19, " Who hath re- sisted his will?" which that none hath or can he gTants in the fol- lowing verses, Corvinus affirms, ^" It is only an objection of the Jews, rejected by the apostle;" — which is much like an answer young scholars usually give to some difficult place in Aristotle, when they cannot think of a better, "Loquitur ex aliorum sententia;" for there is no sign of any such rejection of it by the apostle in the whole following discourse ; yea, and it is not the Jews that St Paul disputeth withal here, but weaker brethren concerning the Jews, which is manifest from the first verse of the next chapter, where he distinguisheth be- tween "brethren" to whom and "Israel " o/whom he spake. Secondly, He speaks of the Jews in the whole treatise in the third person, but of the disputer in the second. Thirdly, It is taken for a confessed principle between St Paul and the disputer, as he calls him, that the Jews were rejected, which surely themselves would not readily ac- knowledge. So that Corvinus rejects, as an objection of the Jews, a granted principle of St Paul and the other Christians of liis time. With the like confidence the same author affirmeth, ^" That they nothing doubt but that many things are not done which God would have to be done." Vorstius goes farther, teaching ^"that not only many things are [not] done which he would have done, but also that many things are done which he would not have done." He means not