wisdom, and righteousness, or he was not. If he was not, where is his omnipotence, who is not able to fulfil his righteous designs and purposes in ways corresponding to that state of agents and things which, he hath allotted them? How can it be said of him, "He will work, and none shall let him?" That God engageth his power for the accomplishment of his purposes was showed before. If he were able to accomplish it, why did he not do it, but suffer himself to be frustrated of his end ? Is it suitable to the sovereign will and wisdom of God eternally to purpose and decree that which, by means agree- able to his holiness and goodness, he is able to bring to pass, and yet not to do it, but to fail and come short of his holy and gracious in- tendment?
Thirdly, The obedience of the bouse of Eli, on which the accom- plishment of the pretended decree is suspended, was such as either they were able of themselves to perform, or they were not. To say they were, is to exclude the necessary assistance of the grace of God, which Mr Goodwin hath not in terms declared himself to do, nor are we as yet arrived at that height, though a considerable progress hath been made. If they were not able to do it without the assistance of the Spirit and concun-ence of the grace of God, did the Lord pur- pose to give them that assistance, working in them both to will and to do of his own good pleasure, or did he not? If he did so purpose, why did he not do it? If he did not purpose to do it, to what end did he decree that that should come to pass which he knew could not come to pass without his doing that which he was resolved never to do? It is all one as if a man knew that another were shut up in a prison, from whence it was impossible that any body but himself should deliver him, and should resolve and purpose to give the poor prisoner a hundred pounds, so that he would come out of prison to him, and resolve withal never to bring him out,
Foiu'thl^, God from eternity foresaw that the priesthood should not be continued to the house of Eli; therefore he did not from eternity purpose and decree that it should. To know that a thing shall not be, and to determine that it shall be, is a ffx^S'S rather beseeming a half frantic creature than the infinitely wise Creator. Again; upon what account did God foresee that it should not be so? Can the futurition of contingent events be resolved in the issue into any thing but God's sovereign determination? God, therefore, did not determine and purpose that it should be so, because he deter- mined and purposed that it should not be so. Whatsoever he doth in time, that he purposed to do from eternity. Now, in time he re- moved the priesthood from the house of Eli; therefore he etenially purposed and determined so to do: which surely leaves no place for a contrary j^urpose and decree (not so much as conditional) that it should so continue for ever. The truth is, the mystery of this abomi-
III.J THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE PURPOSES. 1 65
nation lies in those things which lie not in my way now to handle. A disjunctive decree, a middle science, creature-dependency, are father, mother, and nurse, of the assertion we oppose, whose mon- strous deformity and desperate rebellion against the properties of God I may, the Lord assisting, hereafter more fully demonstrate.
But you will say, " Doth not the Lord plainly hold out a purpose and decree in these words, ' I said indeed?' Did he say it? Will you assign hypocrisy to him, and doubling with the sons of men?"
I say, then, secondly, that the expression here used holds out no intention or purpose of God as to the futurition and event of the thing itself, that the priesthood should continue in the house of Eli, but only his purpose and intention that obedience and the priest- hood should go together. There is a connection of things, not an intendment or purpose of events, in the words intimated. The latter cannot be ascribed to God without the charge of as formal muta- bility as the poorest creature is liable to. Mr Goodwin, indeed, tells you, sect. 43, p. 209, " That the purpose of God itself, considered as an act or conception of the mind of God, dependeth not on any con- dition whatever; and all God's purposes and decrees, without ex- ception, are in such respect absolute and independent." How weak and unable this is to free the Lord from a charge of changeableness upon his supposal needs little pains to demonstrate. The concep- tions of the minds of the sons of men, and their purposes as such, are as absolutely free and unconditional as the nature of a creature will admit ; only the execution of our purposes and resolves is suspended upon the intervention of other things, which render them all condi- tional. And this, it seems, is the state with God himself, although in the Scripture he most frequently distinguisheth himself from the sons of men on this account, that they purpose at the greatest rate of uncertainty imaginable, as to the accomplishment of their thoughts, and therefore are frequently disappointed, but his purposes and his counsels stand for ever: so Ps. xxxiii. 10, 11. The expression then here, " I said," relates plainly to the investiture of Aaron and his seed in the priesthood. There was a twofold engagement made to the house of Aaron about that office, — one in general to him and his sons, the other in particular to Phinehas and his posterity. The latter to Phinehas is far more expressive and significant than th» other. You have it Num. xxv. 11-13, "Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the priest, hath turned my wrath away from the children of Israel, while he was zealous for my sake among them, that I consumed not the children of Israel in my jealousy. Wherefore say. Behold, I give unto him my covenant of peace: and he shall have it, and his seed after him, even the covenant of an everlasting priesthood ; because he was zealous for his God, and made an atonement for the children of Israel." Here is a promise indeed,