And this may suffice to this exception of Mr B,, by the way, against the simplicity of the being of God ; yet, because he doth not directly op- pose it afterward, and the asserting of it doth clearly evert all his follow- ing fond imaginations of the shape, corporeity, and limitedness of the essence of God (to which end also I shall, in the consideration of his several depravations of the truth concerning the nature of God, insist upon it), I shall a little here divert to the explication of what we intend by the simplicity of the essence of God, and confirm the truth of what we so in- tend thereby.
As was, then, intimated before, though simplicity seems to be a positive term, or to denote something positivc-ly, yet indeed it is a pure negation,^ and formally, immediately, and properly, denies multiplication, composi- tion, and the like. And though this only it immediately denotes, yet there is a most eminent perfection of the nature of God thereby signified to us ; which is negatively proposed, because it is in the use of things that are proper to us, in which case we can only conceive what is not to be ascribed to God. Now, not to insist on the metaphysical notions and distinctions of simplicity, by the ascribing of it to God we do not only deny that he is compounded of divers principles really distinct, but also of such as are improper, and not of such a real distance, or that he is comjiounded of any thing, or can be compounded with any thing whatever.
First, then, that this is a property of God's essence or being is manifest from his absolute independence and Jirstness in being and operation, which God often insists upon in the revelation of himself: Isa. xllv. 6, " I am the first, and I am the last ; and beside me there is no God." Rev. i. 8, " I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is," etc. : so chap. xxi. 6, xxii, 13. Which also is fully asserted, Rom. xi. 35, 36, "Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? for of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom
' " Via remotionis utendum est, in Dei consideratione : namdivina substantia sua im- mensitate cxccdit omnem formam, quam intellectus noster intelligit, unde ipsum non possumus exacte cognoscere quid sit, sed quid non sit." — Thorn. Con. Gentes, lib, i. cap. xiv, " Mcrito dictum est a vetcribus, potius in bac Tita de Deo a nobis cognosei quid non sit, quam quid sit ; ut enim cognoscamus quid Deus non sit, negatione nimirum aliqua, quse propria sit divinae essentite, satis est unica negatio dependentiaj," etc. — Socin. ad lib. ii. cap i. ; Metaph. Arist, q. 2, sect. 4.
' Suarez. Metaph. torn. ii. disput. 30, sect, 3; Cajetan. de Ente et Essen, cap ii.
72 THE PREFACE OF MR RIDDLE
be glory for ever." Now, if God were of any causes, internal or external, any principles antecedent or superior to liim, he could not be so absolutely first and independent. Were he composed of parts, accidents, manner of being, he could not be first ; for all tliese are before that which is of them, and therefore his essence is absolutely simple.
Secondly, God is absolutely and perfectly one and the same, and nothing differs from his essence in it: "The LoaD our God is one Lord," Deut.vi. 4; *' Thou art the same," Ps. cii. 27. And where there is an absolute oneness and sameness in the whole, there is no composition by an union of extremes. Thus is it with God : his name is, " I am ; I am that I am," Exod. iii. 14, 15 ; "Which is," Rev. i. 8. He, then, who is what he is, and whose all that is in him is, himself, hath neither parts, accidents, principles, nor any thing else, whereof his essence should be compounded.
Thirdly, The attributes of God, which alone seem to be distinct tilings in the essence of God, are all of them essentially the same loith one another, and every one the same with the essence of God itself. For, first, they are spoken one of another as well as of God ; as there is his "eternal power" as well as his " Godhead." And, secondly, they are either infinite and infinitely perfect, or they are not. If they are, then if they are not the same with God, there are more things infinite than one, and consequently more Gods; for that which is absolutely inlinite is absolutely perfect, and consequently God. If tliey are not infinite, then God knows not himself, for a finite wisdom cannot know perfectly an infinite being. And this might be far- ther confirmed by tlie particular consideration of all kinds of composition, with a manifestation of the imj^ossibility of their attribution unto God ; arguments to which purpose the learned reader knows where to fiiid in abundance.
Fourthly, Yea, that God is, and must needs be, a simple act (which ex- pression Mr B. fixes on for the rejection of it) is e\ident from this one con- sideration, which was mentioned before : If he be not so, there vnist be some potentiality in God. Whatever is, and is not a simjile act, hath a possibility to be perfected by act; if this be in God, he is not perfect, nor all-sufiicient. Every composition whatever is of power and act ; which if it be, or might have been in God, he could not be said to be immutable, which the Scrip- ture plentifully witnesseth that he is.