sacrifice, John xvii. 19. So that, indeed, the deity of Christ, that supported, bore up, and sanctified the human nature as offered, was the altar, and the cross was but an instrument of the cruelty of man^ that taketh place in the death of Christ as it was a penalty, but hath no place in it as a sacrifice.
That this sacrifice of Christ was a sacrifice of propitiation, as made by blood, as answering the typical sacrifices of old, and that the end and effect of it was atonement or reconciliation, shall elsewhere be more fully manifested; the discovery of it, also, will in part be made by what in the ensuing discourse shall be spoken about reconcilia- tion itself.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Of the death of Christ as it was a punishment, and the satisfaction made
thereby.
So is the death of Christ revealed as a price and a sacrifice. What are the proper effects of it imder these considerations shall be after- ward declared.
III. The third consideration of it is its being a PENALTY or a pun- ishment. To clear this I shall demonstrate four things: — 1. What punishment, properly so called, is; 2. That Christ's death was a punishment, or that in his death he did undergo punishment; 3. What that was that Christ underwent, or the material cause of that punishment; 4. Wherein the formality of its being a punishment did consist, or whence that dispensation had its equity.
For the first, I shall give, 1. The definition of it, or the descrip- tion of its general nature ; 2. The ends of it are to be considered.
1. For the first, that usual general description seemeth to be com- prehensive of the whole nature of punishment ; it is " malum pas- sionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis," — an evil of suffering in- flicted for doing evil. Or, more largely to describe it, it is an effect of justice in him who hath sovereign power and right to order and dispose of offenders, whereby he that doth contrary to the rule of his actions is recompensed with that which is evil to himself, accord- ing to the demerit of his fault.^
(1.) It is an effect of justice.^ Hence God's punishing is often called an inflicting of anger; as Rom. iii. 5, "Is God unrighteous, 6 s-zupspuv rriv opyr,v, who inflicteth anger?" Anger is put for the jus- tice of God, Rom. i. 18, " The anger (or wrath) of God is revealed
• " Si non reddit faciendo quod debet rcddet patiendo quod debet." — Aug. lib. iii. dc Lib. Arbit.
- Vid. Diat. de Just. Vindic, translated, vol. X. Aixr> rifiufias d-ralrrKri; -xafk -reUv fTpin'Sixtixiruv. — Hier.
VOL. XII. 28
434 VINDICIJ5 EVANGELICiE.
from heaven/' etc.; that is, his vindictive justice against sin is ma- nifested by its effects. And again, the cause [is put] for the effect, — anger for the effect of it in punishment; and therefore we have translated the word " vengeance," Rom. iii. 5, which denotes the punishment itself.
(2.) It is of him who hath sovereign power and judiciary right to dispose of the offenders: and this is either immediate in God him- self, as in the case whereof we speak, — he is the " only lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy, " James iv. 1 2, — or it is by him de- legated to men for the use of human society ; so Christ tells Pilate, he could have no power over him (whom he considered as a male- factor) unless it were given him from above, John xix. 11, though that is spoken in reference to that peculiar dispensation.
(3.) The nature of it consists in this, that it be evil to him on whom it is inflicted, either by the immission of that which is cor- rupting, vexing, and destroying, or the subtraction of that which is cheering, useful, good, and desirable, in what kind soever; and therefore did the ancients call the punishment "fraus," because when it came upon men, they had deceived and cut short themselves of some good that otherwise they might have enjoyed. So the his- torian : " Cseterse multitudini diem statuit, ante quam liceret sine fraude ab armis disced ere;" that is, that they might go away freely without punishment.^ And so is that expression explained by Ulpian, Dig. lib. XX.: " Capitalem fraudem admittere est tale aliquid delin- quere, propter quod capite puniendus sit."
The schoolmen have two rules that pass amongst them without control : — First, that " Omne peccatum est adeo voluntarium, ut si uon sit voluntarium non est peccatum." It is so of the nature of sin that it be voluntary, that if any thing be not voluntary, it is not sin. The other is, " Est ex natura poense ut sit involuntaria." It is so of the nature of punishment that it be against the will of him that is punished, that if it be not so, it is not punishment.
Neither of which rules is true, yea, the latter is undoubtedly false.
For the former, every sin is thus far, indeed, voluntary, that what is done contrary to the express will of him that doth it is not his sin ; but that the actual will or willing of the sinner is required to make any thing his sin is false, — in the case of original sin manifestly. Wherefore John gives us another definition of sin than theirs is, that it is " dictum, factum, concupitum, contra legem," — namely, that it is avo/jula, " a transgression of the law." Have it the actual consent of the will or no, if ib be a transgression of the law, an inconformity to the law, it is sin.