(1.) There is in his will a principle fixed on good, on all good. Rom. vii. 21. ' He would do good.' The prin- ciple of grace in the will, inclines him to all good. And this in general is prevalent against the principle of sin, so that the will is denominated from thence. Grace hath the rule and dominion, and not sin, in the will of every believer. Now that consent unto sin in the will, which is contrary to the inclination and generally prevailing principle in the same will, is not, cannot be, total, absolute, and complete.
(2.) There is not only a general, ruling, prevailing prin- ciple in the will against sin, but there is also a secret re- luctancy in it against its own act in consenting unto sin. It is true, the soul is not sensible sometimes of this reluc- tancy, because the present consent carries away the prevail- ing act of the will, and takes away the sense of the lusting
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of the Spirit, or reluctancy of the principle of grace in the will. But the general rule holdeth in all things at all times. Gal. V. 17. 'The Spirit lusteth against the flesh:' it doth so actually, though not always to the same degree, nor with the same success. And the prevalency of the contrary principle in this or that particular act, doth not disprove it. It is so on the other side. There is no acting of grace iu the will but sin lusts against it ; although that lusting be not made sensible in the soul, because of the prevalency of the contrary acting of grace ; yet it is enough to keep those actings from perfection in their kind. So is it in this re- nitency of grace against the acting of sin in the soul ; though it be not sensible in its operations, yet it is enough to keep that act from being full and complete. And much of spiritual wisdom lies in discerning aright between the spiritual renitency of the principle of grace in the will against sin, and the rebukes that are given the soul by con- science upon conviction for sin.
4. Observe, that reiterated repeated acts of the con- sent of the will unto sin, may beget a disposition and inclinableness in it unto the like acts, that may bring the will unto a proneness and readiness to consent unto sin upon easy solicitations, which is a condition of soul dan- gerous, and greatly to be watched against.
5. This consent of the will which we have thus de- scribed, may be considered two ways,
(1.) As it is exercised about the circumstances, causes, means and inducements unto sin.
(2.) As it respects this or that actual sin.
In the first sense, there is a virtual consent of the will unto sin in every inadvertency unto the prevention of it, in every neglect of duty that makes way for it, in every hearken- ing unto any temptation leading towards it. In a word, in all the diversions of the mind from its duty, and entangle- ments of the affections by sin before-mentioned. For where there is no act of the will formally, or virtually, there is no sin. But this is not that which we now speak of; but in particular the consent of the will unto this or that actual sin, so far as that either sin is committed, or is prevented by other ways and means not of our present consideration. And herein consists the conceiving of sin.
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These things being supposed, that which in the next place we are to consider, is the way that the deceit of sin proceedeth in ; to procure the consent of the will, and so to conceive actual sin in the soul. To this purpose observe,
[1.] That the will is a rational appetite; rational as guided by the mind ; and an appetite as excited by the affections ; and so in its operation or actings hath respect to both, is influenced by both.
[2.] It chooseth nothing, consents to nothing, but ' sub rati one boni,' as it hath an appearance of good, some present good. It cannot consent to any thing under the notion or apprehension of its being evil in any kind. Good is its natural and necessary object, and therefore whatever is proposed unto it for its consent, must be proposed under an appearance of being either good in itself, or good at present unto the soul, or good so circumstantiate as it is; so that,
[3.] We may see hence the reason why the concep- tion of sin is here placed as a consequent of the mind's being drawn away, and the affections being entangled. Both these have an influence into the consent of the will, and the conception of this or that actual sin thereby. Our way therefore here is made somewhat plain. We have seen at large how the mind is drawn away by the deceit of sin, and how the affections are entangled ; that which remains is but the proper effect of these things. For the discovery whereof we must instance in some of the special deceits, corrupt and fallacious reasonings before-mentioned, and then shew their prevalency on the will to a consent unto sin.
1st. The will is imposed upon by that corrupt reason- ing, that grace is exalted in a pardon; and that mercy is provided for sinners. This first, as hath been shewed, de- ceives the mind, and that opens the way to the will's con- sent, by removing a sight of evil vvliich the will hath an aversation unto. And this in carnal hearts prevails so fin- as to make them think that their liberty consists in being- servants of corruption, 2 Pet. ii. 19. And the poison of it doth oftentimes taint and vitiate the minds of believers themselves; whence we are so cautioned against it in the Scripture. To what therefore hath been spoken before, unto