St Paul, dkecting one of his epistles unto "All that in every place call upon the name of Jesus Christ our Lord," that no countenance from that expression of "Jesus Christ our Lord" might be given unto any surmise of his appropriating unto himself and those with him a peculiar interest in Jesus Christ, he adds immediately, " Both their Lord and ours," — the Lord of all that in every place call upon his name, 1 Cor. i. 2. This was the old Catholicism, which the new hath as much affinity unto as darkness hath to light, and not one jot more. " The Scripture is ours, and Christ is ours, and what have any else to do with them ? What thougli in other places you call on the name of Jesus Christ, yet he is our Lord, not yours." This, I say, is that wretched schism which, clothed with the name of Catholicism (which, after it had slain, it robbed of its name and garments), the world for
856 A VINDICATION OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ON FIAT LUX.
some ages hath groaned under, and is hke to do so whilst it is sup- ported by so many secular advantages and interests as are subservient unto it at this day.
CHAPTER XIY.
Of reason — Jews' objections against Christ.
Page 47. You proceed to vindicate your unreasonable paragraph about reason, or rather against it. What reason we are to expect in a dispute against the use of reason in and about the things which are the highest and most proper object of it, is easy for any one to ima- gine; for by reason in religion we understand not merely the ratio- cination of a man, upon and according to the inbred principles of liis nature, but every acting of the imderstanding of a man about the things of God, proceeding from such principles, or guided by any such rule, as no way impeach its rationality. To vindicate your discourse in your " Fiat" upon this subject, you make use of two mediums: — 1. You pretend that to be the whole subject of your dis- course about reason which is but a part of it ; and, 2. You deny that to be the design and aim of your book which you yourself know, and all other men acknowledge, so to be.
On the first head you tell me that your discourse concerned " rea- son to be excluded from the employment of framing articles of reli- gion." It is true you talk somewhat to that purpose; and you were told that Protestants were no way concerned in that discourse. And it is no less true that you dispute against the use and exercise of reason in our choice of, or adhering unto, any religion, or any way or practice in religion; that is, the liberty of a man's rational judg- ment in determining what is right and what is wrong, Avhat true, what false, in the things that are proposed unto him as belonging unto reli- gion, guided, bounded, and determined by the only rule, measure, and last umpire in and about such things. This you oppose and that directly, and that to this end, — to show unto Protestants that they can come unto no certainty in religion by this exercise of their rea- son in and about the things of God. That men should, by the use of reason, endeavour to find out and frame a religion, is fond to imagine. They who ever attempted any such thing knew it was not religion, but a pretence to some other end, that they were coining. To make the reason of a man, proceeding and acting upon its own light and inbred principles, the absolute and sovereign judge of the things that are proposed to be believed or practised in religion, so as
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that it should be free for him to receive or reject them, according as they answer and are suited thei'eunto, is no less absurd and foolish: and whoever will assert it must build his assertion on this supposi- tion, that a man is capable of comprehending fally and clearly what- soever God can reveal of himself; which is contrary to the prime dictates of reason, in reference unto the simplicity and infiniteness of God's being, and so would imply a contradiction in its first admission. It is no less untrue that a man, in the lapsed, depraved condition of nature, can, by the light thereof, and the utmost improvement of his reason, come to a saving, sanctifying perception of the things them- selves that God hath revealed concerning himself, his will, and wor- ship; which is the peculiar effect of the Spirit and grace of Christ. But to say that a man is not to use his reason in finding out the sense and meaning of the propositions wherein the truths of religion are represented unto him, and in judging of their truth and Mse- hood by the rule of them, which is the Scripture, is to deny that indeed we are men, and to put a reproach upon our mortality, by intimating that men do not, cannot, nor ought to do, that which they not only know they do, but also that they cannot but do : for they do but vainly deceive themselves who suppose, or rather dream, that they make any determination of what is true or false in religion without the use and exercise of their reason ; it is to say the}^ do it as beasts, and not as men, — than which nothing can be spoken more to the dishonour of religion, nor more effectual to deter men from the entertainment of it. For our part we rejoice in this, that we dare avow the religion which we profess to be highly rational, and that the inost ^mysterious articles of it are proposed unto our belief on grounds of the most unquestionable reason, and such as cannot be rejected without a contradiction to the most sovereign dictates of that intellectual nature wherewith of God we are endued. And it is not a few trifling instances of some men's abuse of their reason, in its prejudicate exercise about the things of God, that shall make us ungrateful to God that he hath made us men, or to neglect the lay- ing out of the best that he hath intrusted us with by nature in his service in the work of grace. And what course do you yourself pro- ceed in? When any thing is proposed unto you concerning religion, do you not think upon it? doth not your mind exercise about it those first acts of reason or understanding which prepare and dispose you to discourse and comiyute it with yourself? do you not consider whether the thing itself be good or evil, and whether the proposi- tions wherein it is made unto you are true or false ? do you not call to mind the rule and measure whereby you are to make a judgment whether they be so or no? We talk not now what that ride is, but only whether you do not make a judgment of the propositions that