SECT. 11-13.] THE FATHER AND THE SON. _ 87
First, To demonstrate that the things which he underwent in his human nature were just and equal, inasmuch as himself whose it was voluntarily consented thereunto. Secondly, To manifest that those very acts which he had in command from his Father were no less the acts of his own will. Wherefore, as it is said that the Father loved us, and gave his Son to die for us; so also it is said that the Son loved us, and gave himself for us, and washed us in his own blood. These things proceeded from and were founded in the will of the Son of God; and it was an act of perfect liberty in him to engage into his peculiar concernments in this covenant. What he did, he did by choice, in a way of condescension and love, And this his voluntary susception of the discharge of what he was to perform, according to the nature and terms of this covenant, was the ground of the authoritative mission, sealing, and commanding, of the Father towards him. See Ps. lx. 7,8; Heb. x. 5; John x. 17, 18. And whatever is expressed in the Scripture concerning the will of the human nature of Christ, as it was engaged in and bent upon its work, it is but a representation of the will of the Son of God when he engaged into this work from eternity. So then he freely under- took to do and suffer whatever on his part was required; and therein owns himself the servant of the Father, because he would obey his will and serve his purposes in the nature which he would assume for that end, Isa. xlii. 1, 6, xlix. 8,9; Zech. xiii. 7; and therein ac- knowledgeth him to be his Lord, Ps. xvi. 2, unto whom he owed all homage and obedience: for this mind was in him, that whereas he was in the form of God, he humbled himself unto this work, Phil. ii. 5-8, and by his own voluntary consent was engaged therein. Whereas, therefore, he had a sovereign and absolute power over his own human nature when assumed, whatever he submitted unto, it Was no injury unto him, nor injustice in God to lay it on him.
13. But this sacred truth must be cleared from an objection where- unto it seems obnoxious, before we do proceed. “The will is a natu- ral property, and therefore in the divine essence it is but one. The Father, Son, and Spirit, have not distinct wills) They are one God, and God’s will is one, as being an essential property of his nature; and therefore are there two wills in the one person of Christ, whereas there is but one will in the three persons of the Trinity. How, then, can it be said that the will of the Father and the will of the Son did concur distinctly in the making of this covenant?”
This difficulty may be solved from what hath been already de- clared; for such is the distinction of the persons in the unity of the divine essence, as that they act in natural and essential acts rect- procally one towards another,—namely, in understanding, love, and the like; they know and mutually love each other. And as they
88 FEDERAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN [EXERC. XXVIII.
subsist distinctly, so they also act distinctly in those works which are of external operation. And whereas all these acts and opera- tions, whether reciprocal or external, are either with a will or from a freedom of will and choice, the will of God in each person, as to the peculiar acts ascribed unto him, is his will therein peculiarly and eminently, though not exclusively to the other persons, by reason of their mutual in-being. The will of God as to the peculiar actings of the Father in this matter is the will of the Father, and the will of God with regard unto the peculiar actings of the Son is the will of the Son; not by a distinction of sundry wills, but by the distinct application of the same will unto its distinct acts in the persons of the Father and the Son. And in this respect the covenant whereof we treat differeth from a pure decree; for from these distinct actings of the will of God in the Father and the Son there doth arise a new habitude or relation, which is not natural or necessary unto them, but freely taken on them. And by virtue hereof were all believers saved from the foundation of the world, upon the account of the in- terposition of the Son of God antecedently unto his exhibition in the flesh; for hence was he esteemed to have done and suffered what he had undertaken so to do, and which, through faith, was imputed unto them that did believe.
14, Moreover, a covenant must be about the disposal of things zn the power of them that enter into it, otherwise it is null or fraudu- lent. And thus things may be two ways ;—first, Absolutely; secondly, By virtue of some condition or something in the nature of the cove- nant itself.
(1.) Things are absolutely in the power of persons, when they are completely at their disposal antecedently unto the consideration of any covenant or agreement about them; as in the covenant of mar- riage, where the several persons engaging are sui jurts,—they have an ‘absolute power in themselves to dispose of their own persons with respect unto the ends of marriage. - So it is in all covenants. When the things to be disposed of according to the limitations of the cove- nant are lawful and good antecedently unto any agreement made about them, and because they are in the power of the covenanters, they may be disposed of according to the terms of the compact. So was it in this covenant. To do good unto mankind, to bring them unto the enjoyment of himself, was absolutely in the power of the Father. And it was in the power of the Son to assume human nature, whichbecoming thereby peculiarly his own, he might dispose of it unto what end he pleased, saving the union which ensued on its assumption, for this was indissoluble.