Fourthly, The justice ef God required a punishment of sin as a punishment. Hereunto do belong the way and degree, the time, season, and manner of it; but these things are not necessarily stated in the justice of God. The assignation and determination of them belong unto his sovereign will and wisdom. So would things have _ been ordered in the execution of the sentence of the law on Adam, had it not been taken off by the interposition of the Mediator. Whatever, therefore, God doth in this kind, when he hasteneth or deferreth deserved punishments, in the aggravation or diminution of penalties, it is all in the disposal of his holy will.
Fifthly, Whereas, upon the suppositions mentioned, I do affirm that it is necessary, on the consideration of the nature of God and
106 NECESSITY OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST [EXERC. XXIX.
his natural right to govern his creatures, that sin should be punished, yet I say not that God punisheth sin necessarily; which would ex~ press the manner of his operation, and not the reason of it. He doth not punish sin as the sun gives out light and heat, or as the fire burns, or as heavy things tend downwards, by a necessity of nature. He doth it freely, exerting his power by a free act of his will. For the necessity asserted doth only exclude an antecedent indifferency, upon all the suppositions laid down. It denies that, on these re- spects, it is absolutely indifferent with God whether sin be punished or no. Such an indifferency, I say, is opposite unto the nature, law, truth, and rule of God, and therefore such a necessity as excludes it must herein be asserted. It is not, then, indifferent with God whe- ther sin, or the transgression of his law, be punished or no, and that because his justice requireth that it should be punished; so far, therefore, it is necessary that so it should be. But herein is God a free agent, and acts freely in what he doth, which is a necesgary mode of all divine actings ad eawtra; for God doth all things accord- ing to the counsel of his own will, and his will is the original of all freedom. - But suppose the determination of his will, and the divine nature necessarily requireth an acting suitable unto itself. It is al- together free to God whether he will speak unto any of his creatures or no: but supposing the determination of his will that he will so speak, it is absolutely necessary that he speak truly; for truth is an essential property of his nature, whence he is “ God that cannot lie.” It was absolutely free to God whether he would create this world or no: but on supposition that so he would do, he could not but create it omnipotently and infinitely wisely; for so his nature doth require, because he is essentially omnipotent and infinitely wise. So there was no necessity absolute in the nature of God that he should punish sin: but on supposition that he would create man, and would permit him to sin, it was necessary that his “sin should be avenged ;” for this his righteousness and dominion over his creatures did require. 10. It is objected, “That on the same suppositions it will be no less necessary that God should pardon sin than that he should punish it. For mercy is no less an essential property of his nature than justice ; and if, on supposition of the proper object of justice and its qualifica- tion, it is necessary that it should be exercised,—that is, that where sin is there also should be punishment,—why then, on the supposi- tion of the proper object of mercy and its qualification, is it not necessary that it also should be exercised,—that is, that where there is sin and misery there should be pity and pardon? And whereas one of these must give place unto the other, or else God can act nothing at all towards sinners, why may we not rather think that justice should yield as it were to mercy, and so all be pardoned,
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SECT. 10, 11.] ON THE SUPPOSITION OF SIN AND GRACE. 107
than that mercy should so far give place to justice as that all should be punished ?”
Ans. (1.) We shall make it fully appear that God hath, in infinite wisdom and grace, so ordered all things in this matter that no dis- advantage doth redound either to his justice or his mercy, but that both of them are gloriously exercised, manifested, and exerted. That this was done by the substitution of the Son of God in their stead, to answer divine justice, who were to be pardoned by mercy, and that it could be done no otherwise, is that which we are in the confirmation of. And those by whom this is denied can give no tolerable account why all are not condemned, seeing God is infinitely righteous, or all are not pardoned, seeing he is infinitely merciful. For what they fancy concerning impenitency will not-relieve them; for if God can forgive sin without any satisfaction unto his justice, he may forgive every sin, and will do so, because he is infinitely merciful; for what should hinder or stand in the way, if justice do not? But,—
(2.) There is not the same reason of the actual exercise of justice and merey ; for upon the entrance of sin, as it respects the rule of God, the first thing that respects it is justice, whose part it is to preserve all things in their dependence on God; which without the punishment of sin cannot be done. But God is not obliged unto the exercise of mercy, nor doth the forbearance of such an exercise any way intrench upon the holiness of his nature or the glory of his rule. It is true, mercy is no less an essential property of God than justice; but neither the law, nor the state and order of things wherein they were created, nor their dependence on God as the supreme governor of the whole creation, raises any natural respect or obligation between mercy and its object. God, therefore, can execute the punishment which his justice requireth without the least impeachment of his mercy; for no act of justice is contrary unto mercy. But absolutely to pardon where the interest of justice is to punish, is contrary to the nature of God.