16. Gerhoh of Reichersberg (d. 1169) protested most earnestly against the Nestorianism or Nihil- ianism involved in the teachings of Abelard and Peter I;ombard, and maintained that ' the man born of the virgin mother is in truth also to be called the Most High, not only in the nature of the Word always most high, but also in His human nature that has been exalted even to the point of sitting with God the Father.' He claimed for the humanity of Christ ' the same glory, omnipotence, omnisapience, omnivirtue, omnimajesty, which be- long to the Most High Father,' and held that ' the man in Christ is to be adored with worship ' in the highest sense. ' Christ who is everywhere, accord- ing as He wills, cannot be shut up in a place, how- ever beautiful or desirable.' The body of Christ ' so grew, became so dilated, that it filled the whole world.' Again he speaks of Christ's body as 'a spiritual body that has overstepped every limita- tion of time and space.' Thus we see in this Ger- man theologian a strong reaction against French Nominalism towards the Realism of Eutychianism iand Neo-Platonism, which was to go to the utmost extreme in German Mysticism (see above) and to be perpetuated in Lutheranism.
17. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) built upon the foundations of his Scholastic predecessors, and was much influenced in his Christology by the works of John of Damascus and the pseudo - Dionysius. Like most of the mediaeval theologians, he denied the necessity of Incarnation apart from human sin ; yet he guarded carefully against representing it as a mere accident as regards God, a mere assumption of flesh by God as a garment. He insisted upon a personal union of God with hu- manity ; and yet denied that ' the Divine Person so assumed one human nature that it could not assume another.' ' That which is uncreated cannot be comprehended by a created thing.' While he opposed the Nihilianism of Abelard and Peter Lombard, he yet minimized the part taken by the Divine essence in the Incarnation. Like most of his mediaeval predecessors, he denied the person- ality of the humanity in Christ. Personality it found in the Logos as a distinction Divinely con- ferred. Like Peter Lombard also, he maintained that not the Divine nature (which would involve
Father and Spirit as well as Son), but only the Divine Person of the Son, became in any sense united with humanity in the Incarnation. This union bestowed upon humanity nothing of the Divine nature, but only such created graces as humanity was able to appropriate. ' The soul of Christ is a creature, having finite capacity.' This creaturely grace was bestowed in perfection at the moment of incarnation in such measure that its increase is inconceivable. Christ's knowledge did not embrace the Divine knowledge, it being ' im- possible for any creature to comprehend the Divine essence.' Whatever has been, is, or will be, was within the sphere of the comprehension of Christ's soul in the Word ; but not the knowledge of the possible, involving a knowledge of the Divine essence. Thus even the time of the Divine judg- ment which Christ professed not to know He really knew, but was ignorant of only in relation to others. Thomas also denied omnipotence to the soul of Christ on the same ground. Only as the instrument of Deity could the human soul exert superhuman influence. He maintained that in Christ there were two wills, a Divine, which was the active cause of all He did, and a human, which was purely instrumental. In the human will he distinguished between the sensuous (sensitiva) will and the rational will, the former sometimes willing things other than God willed, but not contrary things ; the latter co-operating and harmonizing perfectly with the will of the Word. Yet, while His human will was free, Christ did not have the power to decide for Himself, but was determined by God. Like Peter Lombard, Thomas ascribed Christ's mediatorial function to His humanity and not to His Deity. He agreed with most of his pre- decessors in denying the necessity of the Incarna- tion and suffering of the Son for man's salvation, maintaining that without injustice God might have freely pardoned human sin. Yet he recog- nized the propriety of the plan of redemption actually adopted. The very least degree of suffer- ing on the part of the God-man would have suf- ficed. He finds difficulty in reconciling Christ's sufferings with His blessed fruition, and reaches the conclusion that the higher aspect (the essence) of His soul continued in perfect fruition while the lower suffered. It is evident that this great thinker, while rejecting Eutychianism, Nestorian- ism, and Adoptianism, failed to reach a self-con- sistent view of the relation of the Divine and the human in the Person of Christ.
18. We must conclude our survey of Scholastic Christology with some account of the contribution of John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). Although Scotus differed in many respects from Thomas, and gave his name to a party antagonistic to the latter (Scotists versus Thomists), in Christology he was content for the most part to follow in the path that had been so well beaten by Thomas and his predecessors. Like these, he maintained that the union of the Divine and the human was only a relation so far as the Divine was concerned, and that for the Divine to become anything that was not eternal is inconceivable. More than Thomas he laid stress on the relative independ- ence and separateness of the human in Christ. Independence he regarded as indispensable to per- sonality. He supposed that the human nature of Christ was such that it would have attained to personality apart from the Word ; yet a personality dependent on God, and not, like the Divine, incom- municable. More than Thomas also he kept clear of Adoptianism, and guarded against representing Christ's humanity as a selfless husk (Dorner). He regards Christ's humanity by virtue of Divine pre- destination and grace as exalted to a dignitynot possessed by nature. Scotus had an exalted idea