Literature.— W. Beyschlag, NT Theology, Eng. tr., 1895, bk. i. ch. viii.,bk. ii. ch. v., bk. iv. chs. vi. ix., bk. v. ch.v. ; G. B. Stevens, The Thevlogy of the NT, 1899, pt. i. chs. iii. xii., pt. ii. chs. vi. vii., pt. iv. chs. v. viii. xii., pt. vi. ch. v., pt. vii. ch. iv. ; T. von Haering, The Christian Faith, Eng-. tr., 1913, ii. 800-926 ; A. M. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Chris- tian Reunion, 1902, pp. 94-168 ; O. Pfleiderer, The Philosophy ofReligion'i, Eng. tr., 1886-SS, vol. iv. ch. iv.
Alfred E. Garvie. GOODNESS (HUMAN).*— Two applications go side by side in tiie general usage of the word 'goodness' and are also found in the NT. On the one hand, it denotes an inliorent quality without regard to its efiect ; on the other hand, the 'good- ness' is predicated in view of the efiect. In the latter case, however, the thought of the inherent quality as producing the efiect is never quite absent from the field of consciousness. It is not possible to call either of these two uses the older and more original one and to stamp the other as secondary and developed. Already in Homer (Od. XV. 324, //. xiii. 284) d7a06s occurs of iniierent quality as a designation of the well-born class, as * For Divine poodness, see art. God.
distinguislied from the common people (cf. our 'better class,' 'aristocracy'). When these are at the same time called d7a^ot in the sense of ' brave,' this but shows the close connexion between the inherent and the transient reference of the word. Bravery is the goodness of the aristocracy in action. Hence in the frequent sense of ' efficient,' ' adequate,' the adjective does not describe a momentary or spasmodic efficiency, but the habit- ual one of quality. Good objects, good circum- stances, 'goods,' in the sense of wealth or of delicacies, are all so designated because of their inherent adaptation to benefit the owner or re- ceiver. The force of the word in such connexions can perhaps be felt best from the opposite Trovrjpos. Both meanings are transferred to the moral sphere. The ethical use of the word is, however, in profane Greek a comparatively late development, not being frequent until the philosophical writers {e.g. Plato).
In the NT both the sub-ethical and the ethical use are represented. For the former see Mt 7", Lk ps 88 1218- 19 1625, Ro 828 IQis 13^ Gal G^, He 9", Ja 1^', I P 3^". For the latter, used of persons, see Mt 5« 12^^ 19'6- " 20^5, Mk lO's, Lk IS'^ 23^", Jn 7^2, Ac U^\ Ro 5^ Tit 2^ ; of things, Mt 122^- ^ 19'6, Lk 815 10^2^ Jn 5-^, Ac 23\ Ro 21" V^- '«• i^ 9" 129- 21 133 1416 1019^ 2 Co 51", Eph 429 6^ 1 Th 3^ 5^5, 2 Th 2>7, 1 Ti P- 19, Tit 2i», 1 P 3"- 1^- 1^, and fre- quently in the formula ' good works.'
It will be observed that the ascription of good- ness to persons is rare in the NT. The reason for this is not to be sought in the biblical doctrine of sin as excluding human goodness, for on that view the affirmation of goodness with reference to works ought to be equally rare, which is not the case. The true explanation seems to lie in the God-centred estimate which Scripture places upon man's moral character. Man is measured with strict reference to the nature and will of God as his norm. The conception of ' goodness,' while not excluding, and even presupposing, an objec- tive standard of this kind, does not in itself ex- press it. It describes the quality either as in- herent or as affecting others, but does not explicitly relate it to God. This the word Skatos does, for diKaioavvri means goodness as conformity to the Law of God and as approved by the Divine judg- ment. The full and positive conception of diKaio- avvTj therefore covers all that is aya66s and adds to this the God-related element just named. It is not at variance with this that dcKaios occasionally occurs in a negative sense, more closely adhering to the profane and popular usage — a sense which places it below d7a^6s in the ethical scale. Thus in Ro 5'' the SiKaios {'righteous') is one who merely is free from fault, who does what in the ordinary relations of life can be required of him, but does not go beyond this to the spontaneous exercise of virtue as the dyad6s does. The term 'good' is reserved for the latter. But as a rule dlKaios is not less comprehensive than dyaOds, covering the Divine demand in all its reach (Ro 3'°).
In the ethical application the inherent and the beneficent sense lie so close together that it is not always easy to determine which stands in the foreground and whicli is the mere concomitant of thought. In the Hebrew ain, as used of God, both meanings are present, but the sense of beneficence preponderates (cf. Ps 34"). In regard to Mt 19'^ ( = Mk 10'8, Lk W\ usually understood as raising the question of absolute ethical perfection, G. Dalman (Die Worte Jesu, 1898, i. 277) advocates the same meaning of beneficence. Among the passages which refer to human persons Ro b'' not only extends the reach of ' goodness ' beyond that of ' righteousness,' but also finds this overlapping in the spontaneous, benevolent character of the former. In Lk 235" the same distinction may be