of objects and qualities with this state of things, it must be borne in mind that the primary laws of con- sciousness, the ultimate conditions of thought, are the means according to which this agreement or disagree- ment is ascertained. The standard of truth lies deep in the constitution of man, and if he fails to judge rightly in reference to any statement, the error is to be found, not in the standard, but in a perverse mis- application of the standard. And herein lies the dif- ference in the opinions of men. They are each of them provided with an unerring standard in so far as they are concerned. They do not, because the}' can- not disbelieve the primary laws of thought or self- consciousness ; but in the application of these they commence a system of error, and therefore of doubt, leading at length to disbelief. The original belief is certain, because the standard is certain on which it is grounded ; and could all other facts and events be brought back to the same standard, the judgment, as to their truth or falsehood, would, so far as we are con- cerned, be unerring. Now the great design for which, in every case of doubt or disputation, evidence and ar- guments of every kind are adduced is, that the appeal may be carried through a variety of different steps to this, the highest, the purest, the most certain of all earthly tribunals — the reason, not of an individual man, but of humanity. This is the common platform on which men of all characters, of all sects, of all opin- ions, may meet in cordial agreement. The principles are the common property of the race in general ; they are tie conditions in virtue of which they assert their position in the world as rational and intelligent crea- tures. Without such common principles all evidence would bo powerless, all argument unavailing. With- out an original standard of truth in his own breast, this world would have become a state of universal scepticism; nay, rather, for such a state of things is impossible, there would have been no ground for either belief or doubt, affirmation or denial" (Gardner, Cydo- piedia). On the relation of the will to belief we cite the following from Hopkins (Lowell Lecturts, 1844). " It is true within certain limitations, and under cer- tain conditions, and with respect to certain kinds of truth, that we are not voluntary in our belief; but then these conditions and limitations are such as en- tirely to sever from this truth any consequence that we are not perfectly read}' to admit. We admit that belief is in no case directly dependent on the will ; that in some cases it is entirely independent of it ; but lie must be exceedingly bigoted, or unobservant of what passes around him, who should affirm that the will has no influence. The influence of the will here is analogous to its influence in many other cases. It is as great as it is over the objects which we see. It does not depend upon the will of any man, if he turns his eyes in a particular direction, whether lie shall see a tree there. If the tree be there he must see it, and is compelled to believe in its existence ; but it was en- tirely within his power not to turn his eyes in that di- rection, and thus to remain unconvinced, on the high- est of all evidence, of the existence of the tree, and unimpressed by its beauty and proportion. It is not by his will directly that man has any control over his thoughts. It is not by willing a thought into the mind that he can call it there, and yet we all know that, through attention and habits of association, the subjects of our thoughts are to a great extent directed by the will. It is precisely so in respect to belief; and he who denies this, denies the value of candor, and the influence of party spirit, and prejudice, and interest on the mind. So great is this influence, however, that a keen observer of human nature, and one who will not be suspected of leaning unduly to the doctrine I now advocate, has supposed it to extend even to our belief of mathematical truth. 'Men,' says Hobbes, 'appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn, receding from custom when their
BELIEVERS
7.34
BELL
interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them, which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetu- ally disputed both by the pen and the sword; whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not, in that subject, what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, or profit, or lust. For, J doubt not, if it had been a thing contrary to any m m's ri_;lit of dominion, or to the interest of men who have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doc- trine should have been, if not disputed yet by the burn- ing of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.' 'This,' says Hallam, fnmi whose work I make the quotation, 'does not ex- aggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth when it thwarts the interests or pas- sions of any particular sect or community.' Let a man who hears the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid announced for the first time trace the steps of the dem- onstration, and he nwst believe it to be true ; but let him know that as soon as he does perceive the evi- dence of that proposition, so as to believe it on that ground, he shall lose his right eye, and he will never trace the evidence, or come to that belief which re- sults from the force of the onty proper evidence. You may tell him it is true, but he will reply that he does not know — he doss not see it to be so. So far, then, from finding in this law of belief, the law by which it is necessitated on condition of a certain amount of evi- dence perceived by the mind, an excuse for any who do not receive the evidence of the Christian religion, it is in this very law that I find the ground of their condemnation. Certainly, if God has provided evi- dence as convincing as that for the forty-seventh prop- osition of Euclid, so that all men have to do is to ex- amine it with candor, then they must be without ex- cuse if they do not believe. This, I suppose, God has done. He asks no one to believe except on the ground of evidence, and such evidence as ought to command assent. Let a man examine this evidence with en- tire candor, laying aside all regard for consequences or results, simply according to the laws of evidence, and then, if he is not convinced, I believe God will so far forth acquit him in the great day of judgment. But if God has given man such evidence that a fair, and full, and perfectly candid examination is all that i- needed to necessitate belief, then, if men do not be- lieve, it will be in this verj' law that we shall find the ground of their condemnation. The difficulty will not lie in their mental constitution as related to evidence, nor in the want of evidence, but in that moral condi- tion, that state of the heart, or the will, which prevent- ed a (.roper examination. 'There seems,' says But- ler, ' no possible reason to be given why we may not be in a state of moral probation with regard to the ex- erciseofour understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior in common af- fairs. The former is a thing as much within our power and choice as the latter.' " On the relations of Beiief to Faith, sec Faith.