But if man, in a state of _innocence_, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason the _final judge_ of what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state of _sin_, _ignorance_, and _misery_. His _nature_ and _condition_ is so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against any _supernatural_ help from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms of _mercy_ and deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according to _schemes_ of his _own_ contrivance, not from his _own knowledge_ of the _nature_, and _reason_, and _fitness_ of things, but from some _incomprehensible depth_ of divine goodness.
For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of any _methods_ of _atoning_ for our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.
For to insist upon the _prerogative_ of our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject the _atonement_ which he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that our _own repentance_ should be sufficient without it, is the same height of _pride_ and _impiety_, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.
For as mankind, if they had continued in a state of _innocence_, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they were _fallen_ into a state of guilt and sin, they could never know what _misery_ it would expose them to, or _when_, or _how_, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they had _never_ sinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.
So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint the _atonement_ for his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what it _ought_ to be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man in _innocence_ should have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into a _cherub_.
The writers against revelation appeal to the _reason_ and _nature_ of things, as _infallibly_ discovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.
Thus our author; _If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity_¹.
¹ Page 30.
It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.
But then, this _whole argument_ proves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.
I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is the _sole rule_ of God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by the _sole light_ of his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions.
* For if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _nature_ of things and persons, and this fitness be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be _entirely_ inconceivable by us, so as not to be known _at all_, and in no instances _fully_ known, or _perfectly_ comprehended.
* For if God is to act according to a _fitness founded_ in the _nature_ of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own _incomprehensible_ nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule _above_ all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a _rule_ that is just as _incomprehensible_ to us as his own nature.
* And we can be no farther _competent judges_ of the _fitness_ of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not _infinitely wise_ in God, than we can raise ourselves to a _state_ of infinite wisdom.