3. The Logos. - Viewed in its bearing on New Testament teaching, this part of Philo's system raises the most interesting questions. But it is just here that our difficulties are greatest. We can understand the Platonic conception of the Logos as the archetypal idea,' and that of the Stoics as the world-reason' pervading matter. Similarly, we can perceive, how the Apocrypha - especially the Book of Wisdom - following up the Old Testament typical truth concerning Wisdom' (as specially set forth in the Book of Proverbs) almost arrived so far as to present Wisdom' as a special Subsistence' (hypostatising it). More than this, in Talmudical writings, we find mention not only of the Shem, or Name,' [198] but also of the Shekhinah,' God as manifest and present, which is sometimes also presented as the Ruach ha Qodesh, of Holy Spirit. [199] But in the Targumim we get yet another expression, which, strange to say, never occurs in the Talmud. [200] It is that of the Memra, Logos, or Word.' Not that the term is exclusively applied to the Divine Logos. [201] But it stands out as perhaps the most remarkable fact in this literature, that God - not as in His permanent manifestation, or manifest Presence - but as revealing Himself, is designated Memra. Altogether that term, as applied to God, occurs in the Targum Onkelos 179 times, in the so-called Jerusalem Targum 99 times, and in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 321 times. A critical analysis shows that in 82 instances in Onkelos, in 71 instances in the Jerusalem Targum, and in 213 instances in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, the designation Memra is not only distinguished from God, but evidently refers to God as revealing Himself. [202] But what does this imply? The distinction between God and the Memra of Jehovah is marked in many passages. [203] Similarly, the Memra of Jehovah is distinguished from the Shekhinah. [204] Nor is the term used instead of the sacred word Jehovah; [205] nor for the well-known Old Testament expression the Angel of the Lord;' [206] nor yet for the Metatron of the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and of the Talmud. [207] Does it then represent an older tradition underlying all these? [208] Beyond this Rabbinic theology has not preserved to us the doctrine of Personal distinctions in the Godhead. And yet, if words have any meaning, the Memra is a hypostasis, though the distinction of permanent, personal Subsistence is not marked. Nor yet, to complete this subject, is the Memra identified with the Messiah. In the Targum Onkelos distinct mention is twice made of Him, [209] while in the other Targumim no fewer than seventy-one Biblical passages are rendered with explicit reference to Him.
If we now turn to the views expressed by Philo about the Logos we find that they are hesitating, and even contradictory. One thing, however, is plain: the Logos of Philo is not the Memra of the Targumim. For, the expression Memra ultimately rests on theological, that of Logos on philosophical grounds. Again, the Logos of Philo approximates more closely to the Metatron of the Talmud and Kabbalah. As they speak of him as the Prince of the Face,' who bore the name of his Lord, so Philo represents the Logos as the eldest Angel,' the many-named Archangel,' in accordance with the Jewish view that the name JeHoVaH unfolded its meaning in seventy names for the Godhead. [210] As they speak of the Adam Qadmon,' so Philo of the Logos as the human reflection of the eternal God. And in both these respects, it is worthy of notice that he appeals to ancient teaching. [211]
What, then, is the Logos of Philo? Not a concrete personality, and yet, from another point of view, not strictly impersonal, nor merely a property of the Deity, but the shadow, as it were, which the light of God casts - and if Himself light, only the manifested reflection of God, His spiritual, even as the world is His material, habitation. Moreover, the Logos is the image of God' (ekn) upon which man was made, [212] or, to use the platonic term, the archetypal idea.' As regards the relation between the Logos and the two fundamental Potencies (from which all others issue), the latter are variously represented - on the one hand, as proceeding from the Logos; and on the other, as themselves constituting the Logos. As regards the world, the Logos is its real being. He is also its archetype; moreover the instrument (rganon) through Whom God created all things. If the Logos separates between God and the world, it is rather as intermediary; He separates, but He also unites. But chiefly does this hold true as regards the relation between God and man. The Logos announces and interprets to man the will and mind of God (rmenes ka prophtes); He acts as mediator; He is the real High-Priest, and as such by His purity takes away the sins of man, and by His intercession procures for us the mercy of God. Hence Philo designates Him not only as the High-Priest, but as the Paraclete.' He is also the sun whose rays enlighten man, the medium of Divine revelation to the soul; the Manna, or support of spiritual life; He Who dwells in the soul. And so the Logos is, in the fullest sense, Melchisedek, the priest of the most high God, the king of righteousness (basiles dkaios), and the king of Salem (basiles ernes), Who brings righteousness and peace to the soul. [213] But the Logos does not come into any soul that is dead in sin.' That there is close similarity of form between these Alexandrian views and much in the argumentation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, must be evident to all - no less than that there is the widest possible divergence in substance and spirit. [214] The Logos of Philo is shadowy, unreal, not a Person; [215] there is no need of an atonement; the High-Priest intercedes, but has no sacrifice to offer as the basis of His intercession, least of all that of Himself; the old Testament types are only typical ideas, not typical facts; they point to a Prototypal Idea in the eternal past, not to an Antitypal Person and Fact in history; there is no cleansing of the soul by blood, no sprinkling of the Mercy Seat, no access for all through the rent veil into the immediate Presence of God; nor yet a quickening of the soul from dead works to serve the living God. If the argumentation of the Epistle to the Hebrews is Alexandrian, it is an Alexandrianism which is overcome and past, which only furnishes the form, not the substance, the vessel, not its contents. The closer therefore the outward similarity, the greater is the contrast in substance.