It is in explaining this strange provision, intended both to uphold the solemnity of vows, and to discourage the rash use of words, that the Talmud [3388] makes use of the word hand' in a connection which we have supposed might, by association of ideas, have suggested to Christ the contrast between what the Bible and what the Rabbis regarded as sanctified hands,' and hence between the commands of God and the traditions of the Elders. For the Talmud explains that, when a man simply says: That (or if) I eat or taste such a thing,' it is imputed as a vow, and he may not eat or taste of it, because the hand is on the Qorban' [3389] - the mere touch of Qorban had sanctified it, and put it beyond his reach, just as if it had been laid on the altar itself. Here, then, was a contrast. According to the Rabbis, the touch of a common' hand defiled God's good gift of meat, while the touch of a sanctified' hand in rash or wicked words might render it impossible to give anything to a parent, and so involve the grossest breach of the Fifth Commandment! Such, according to Rabbinic Law, was the common' and such the sanctifying' touch of the hands - and did such traditionalism not truly make void the Word of God'?
A few further particulars may serve to set this in clearer light. It must not be thought that the pronunciation of the votive word Qorban,' although meaning a gift,' or given to God,' necessarily dedicated a thing to the Temple. The meaning might simply be, and generally was, that it was to be regarded like Qorban - that is, that in regard to the person or persons named, the thing termed was to be considered as if it were Qorban, laid on the altar, and put entirely out of their reach. For, although included under the one name, there were really two kinds of vows: those of consecration to God, and those of personal obligation [3390] - and the latter were the most frequent.
To continue. The legal distinction between a vow, an oath, and the ban,' are clearly marked both in reason and in Jewish Law. The oath was an absolute, the vow a conditional undertaking - their difference being marked even by this, that the language of a vow ran thus: That' or if' I or another do such a thing,' if I eat;' [3391] while that of the oath was a simple affirmation or negation, [3392] I shall not eat.' [3393] On the other hand, the ban' might refer to one of three things: those dedicated for the use of the priesthood, those dedicated to God, or else to a sentence pronounced by the Sanhedrin. [3394] In any case it was not lawful to ban' the whole of one's property, nor even one class of one's property (such as all one's sheep), nor yet what could not, in the fullest sense, be called one's property, such as a child, a Hebrew slave, or a purchased field, which had to be restored in the Year of Jubilee; while an inherited field, if banned, would go in perpetuity for the use of the priesthood. Similarly, the Law limited vows. Those intended to incite to an act (as on the part of one who sold a thing), or by way of exaggeration, or in cases of mistake, and, lastly, vows which circumstances rendered impossible, were declared null. To these four classes the Mishnah added those made to escape murder, robbery, and the exactions of the publican. If a vow was regarded as rash or wrong, attempts were made [3395] to open a door for repentance. [3396] Absolutions from a vow might be obtained before a sage,' or, in his absence, before three laymen, [3397] when all obligations became null and void. At the same time the Mishnah [3398] admits, that this power of absolving from vows was a tradition hanging, as it were, in the air, [3399] since it received little (or, as Maimonides puts it, no) support from Scripture. [3400]