These painful details, most reluctantly given, are certainly not intended to raise or strengthen ignorant prejudices against Israel, to whom blindness in part' has truly happened; far less to encourage the wicked spirit of contempt and persecution which is characteristic, not of believing, but of negative theology. But they will explain, how Jesus could not have assumed merely an attitude of indifference towards traditionalism. For, even if such sentiments were represented as a later development, they are the outcome of a direction, of which that of Jesus was the very opposite, and to which it was antagonistic. But, if Jesus was not sent of God - not the Messiah - whence this wonderful contrast of highest spirituality in what He taught of God as our Father, and of His Kingdom as that over the hearts of all men? The attitude of antagonism to traditionalism was never more pronounced than in what He said in reply to the charge of neglect of the ordinance about the washing of hands.' Here it must be remembered, that it was an admitted Rabbinic principle that, while the ordinances of Scripture required no confirmation, those of the Scribes needed such, [3378] and that no Halakhah (traditional law) might contradict Scripture. [3379] When Christ, therefore, next proceeded to show, that in a very important point - nay, in many such like things' - the Halakhah was utterly incompatible with Scripture, that, indeed, they made void the Word of God' by their traditions which they had received, [3380] He dealt the heaviest blow to traditionalism. Rabbinism stood self-condemned; on its own showing, it was to be rejected as incompatible with the Word of God.
It is not so easy to understand, why the Lord should, out of many such things,' have selected in illustration the Rabbinic ordinance concerning vows, as in certain circumstances, contravening the fifth commandment. Of course, the Ten Words' were the Holy of Holies of the Law; nor was there any obligation more rigidly observed - indeed, carried in practice almost to the verge of absurdity [3381] - than that of honour to parents. In both respects, then, this was a specially vulnerable point, and it might well be argued that, if in this Law Rabbinic ordinances came into conflict with the demands of God's Word, the essential contrariety between them must, indeed, be great. Still, we feel as if this were not all. Was there any special instance in view, in which the Rabbinic law about votive offerings had led to such abuse? Or was it only, that at this festive season the Galilean pilgrims would carry with them to Jerusalem their votive offerings? Or, could the Rabbinic ordinances about the sanctification of the hands' (Yadayim) have recalled to the Lord another Rabbinic application of the word hand' (yad) in connection with votive offerings? It is at least sufficiently curious to find mention here, and it will afford the opportunity of briefly explaining, what to a candid reader may seem almost inexplicable in the Jewish legal practice to which Christ refers.
At the outset it must be admitted, that Rabbinism did not encourage the practice of promiscuous vowing. As we view it, it belongs, at best, to a lower and legal standpoint. In this respect Rabbi Akiba put it concisely, in one of his truest sayings: Vows are a hedge to abstinence.' [3382] On the other hand, if regarded as a kind of return for benefits received, or as a promise attaching to our prayers, a vow - unless it form part of our absolute and entire self-surrender - partakes either of work-righteousness, or appears almost a kind of religious gambling. And so the Jewish proverb has it: In the hour of need a vow; in time of ease excess.' [3383] Towards such work-righteousness and religious gambling the Eastern, and especially the Rabbinic Jew, would be particularly inclined. But even the Rabbis saw that its encouragement would lead to the profanation of what was holy; to rash, idle, and wrong vows; and to the worst and most demoralising kind of perjury, as inconvenient consequences made themselves felt. Of many sayings, condemnatory of the practice, one will suffice to mark the general feeling: He who makes a vow, even if he keeps it, deserves the name of wicked.' [3384] Nevertheless, the practice must have attained terrible proportions, whether as regards the number of vows, the lightness with which they were made, or the kind of things which became their object. The larger part of the Mishnic Tractate on Vows' (Nedarim, in eleven chapters) describes what expressions were to be regarded as equivalent to vows, and what would either legally invalidate and annul a vow, or leave it binding. And here we learn, that those who were of full age, and not in a position of dependence (such as wives) would make almost any kind of vows, such as that they would not lie down to sleep, not speak to their wives or children, not have intercourse with their brethren, and even things more wrong or foolish - all of which were solemnly treated as binding on the conscience. Similarly, it was not necessary to use the express words of vowing. Not only the word Qorban' [Korban], given to God', but any similar expression, such as Qonakh, or Qonam [3385] (the latter also a Phoenician expression, and probably an equivalent for Qeyam, let it be established') would suffice; the mention of anything laid upon the altar (though not of the altar itself). such as the wood, or the fire, would constitute a vow, [3386] nay, the repetition of the form which generally followed on the votive Qonam or Qorban had binding force, even though not preceded by these terms. Thus, if a man said: That I eat or taste of such a thing,' it constituted a vow, which bound him not to eat or taste it, because the common formula was: Qorban (or Qonam) that I eat or drink, or do such a thing,' and the omission of the votive word did not invalidate a vow, if it were otherwise regularly expressed. [3387]