Phil. ii. 3. In lowliness of mind let each esteem other better
than themselves.
IT is a common and universally approved saying, that the tree may be known by its fruit. Now we would have the Gospel brought to this test : and we are willing that it should be accepted or rejected, according to the issue of this trial. That good things have been spoken by uninspired men on the subject of humility, we readily admit : for modesty, and a deference to the sentiments of others, necessarily commend themselves to the judgment of every con- siderate mind. But we apprehend that the precept before us is peculiar to Christianity; and, as a maxim in morals, it stands unrivalled in the whole world. In support of this injunction, I will endeavour to shew,
I. Its import —
Certainly it must be understood with some kind of qualification and exception : for it can never be meant, that a philosopher is to esteem an illiterate peasant wiser than himself ; or that a man of strict
morals is to regard a notorious drunkard or libertine as more holy than himself. We can never be re- quired to entertain sentiments so entirely repugnant to truth and fact. We must suppose some kind of parity between the persons so compared ; namely, that both of them profess a regard for God, and both maintain a measure of consistency in their outward conduct. But where there is nothing outward and visible to contradict the sentiment, there it should be entertained ; and we each should conceive of others as better than ourselves :
1. As more pure in their principle —
[We should give persons credit for sincerity in what they profess ; and not, without the strongest evidence, accuse them of hypocrisy. But every man that is acquainted with his own heart has seen in himself a sad mixture of motive, which he cannot but acknowledge before the heart-searching God ; and, consequently, he will do well to regard himself as in- ferior to those whom he cannot convict of any guile, in com- parison of what he knows to have existed and operated within his own bosom.]
2. As more consistent in their practice —
[Of his own inconsistencies, who amongst us has not reason to complain ? Who, for one deviation which he sees in others, may not discern a great many in himself? We are not at liberty to indulge all manner of evil surmises, in order to reduce others to a level with ourselves ; but should put ourselves below others, in proportion as we appear to have fallen short of the measure of their attainments.]
3. As more advanced in proportion to the ad- vantages they have enjoyed —
[We all are responsible for the advantages that have been vouchsafed unto us : " To whom much has been given, of them will the more be required." Now, of the opportuni- ties with which we have been favoured, we must be conscious ; and respecting the length of time that we have professed to seek after God, we must be sensible : but, in reference to others, we must be comparatively ignorant : and therefore, even if, in point of attainment, we appear to stand on a par with them, we ought to take ec lower place than they, because, from the superiority of our advantages, we ought to have been advanced far beyond them.]
Though, in explaining the import of this injunction,