in the situation of a poor man, we might ivish our rich neigh- bour to divide his property with us: but this is no reason why we should go and act thus : the thing is unreasonable in itself: and, however we might wish it, we should not for a moment think that justice or equity required it. So, if we were to put ourselves in the place of a convicted felon, we might ivish the judge not to put the laws in force against us : but that is no reason why we, if sitting in the place of judgment, should not enforce and execute the laws against others. We must not consider so much what we might tvish in such circumstances, as what we should, after full and impartial consideration, think right. We should think it right that the judge should investigate our cause with care, and make his decision with equity ; and, on the whole, should lean to the side of mercy rather than of severity : but we could never persuade ourselves that felons should be permitted to violate the laws with impunity ; because that would render the peaceful members of society a prey to every daring ruffian. It is evident then that we must call in the aid of judgment, and regulate our conduct according to its deliberate and unbiassed dictates.
With the help of these two remarks, we shall be in no danger of misinterpreting the rule before us. Indeed these limitations are so obvious, that, as we said before, they are unconsciously supplied even by the most ignorant of mankind : so that we might have waved all mention of them, if it had not been expedient to mark with precision the limits, which, though generally acknowledged, are but indistinctly seen. In a word, the rule is this : We must consider in all cases what we, under a change of circumstances, should think it right for another to do unto us; and that must be the rule of our conduct towards him.]
Having thus considered the import of the rule, we proceed to shew,
II. Its excellence —
A greater encomium cannot be passed upon it than is in the words before us : *' This is the law and the prophets." But what is implied in this commendation ? and what are those particular excellencies which it holds up to our view ? It intimates, that the rule is eminently distinguished for the following properties :
1. It is concise —
[" The law and the prophets" constitute a very large volume ; to become well acquainted with which in all its parts, requires no little expense, both of time and labour. But, vast as its circumference is, its lines all meet in this rule, as in their