_Rule_ VII. If I cannot discern whether the duty to be omitted, or the sin to be committed, be materially and in other respects the greater, then that will be to me the greater of the sins which my doubting conscience doth most strongly suspect to be sin, in its most impartial deliberation. For if other things be equal, certainly the sinning against more or less conviction or doubting must make an inequality. As, if I could not discern whether my subscription to the Trent Confession, or my forbearing to preach, or my preaching though prohibited, were the greater sin, in case they were all sinful; but yet I am most strongly suspicious of sinfulness in the subscription, and less suspicious of sinfulness in my forbearing in such a case to preach, and least of all suspicious of sinfulness in my preaching though prohibited: in this case to subscribe sinfully is the greatest sin, and to forbear sinfully to exercise my office is the next, and to preach unwarrantably is the least.
_Rule_ VIII. If I could perceive no difference in the degrees of evil in the omission and the commission, nor yet in the degrees of my suspicion or doubting, then that is the greater sin which I had greater helps and evidence to have known, and did not.
_Rule_ IX. If both greater material evil be on one side than on the other, and greater suspicion or evidence of the sinfulness also, then that must needs be the greater sin.
_Rule_ X. If the greatness of the material evil be on one side, and the greatness of the suspicion and evidence be on the other, then the former (if sin) will be materially and in itself considered the worst; but the latter will be formally the greater disobedience to God. But the comparison will be very difficult. As, suppose that I swear to God that I will cast away a shilling, or that I will forbear to pray for a week together; here I take perjury to be a greater sin than my casting away a shilling, or forbearing to pray a week: but when I question whether the oath should be kept or not, I have greater suspicion that it should not than that it should, because no oath must be the bond of the least iniquity. Here, if the not keeping it prove a sin, I shall do that which is the greater sin in itself if I keep it not; but I shall show more disobedience in keeping it, if it be not to be kept.
_Rule_ XI. If it be a double sin that I suspect on one side, and but a single one on the other, it maketh an inequality in the case. As, suppose that in my father's family there are heretics and drunkards, and I swear that in my place and calling I will endeavour to cast them out. My mother approveth my vow; my father is against it, and dischargeth me of it because I did it not by his advice. On one side, I doubt whether I am bound, or may act against my father's will: on the other side, I as much doubt whether I am not perjured, and disobedient to my mother, if I do it not, and whether I disobey not God, that made it my duty to endeavour the thing in my place and calling before I vowed it.
_Rule_ XII. There is a great deal of difference between omitting the substance of a duty for ever, and the delaying it, or altering the time, and place, and manner. For instance, that which will justify or excuse me for shortening my prayer, or for praying but once a day, or at noon rather than in the morning, or for defect in method, or fervency, or expressions, may not justify or excuse me for denying, renouncing, or long forbearing prayer. And that which may excuse an apostle for not preaching in the temple or synagogues, or not having the emperor's or the high priest's allowance or consent, or for not continuing in one city or country; would not excuse them if they had renounced their callings, or totally, as to all times, and places, and manner of performance, have ceased their work for fear of men.
_Rule_ XIII. If the duty to be omitted and the sin to be committed seem equal in greatness, and our doubt be equal as to both, it is commonly held safer to avoid the commission more studiously than the omission. For which there are many reasons given.