_Directions against Unbelief._
[Sidenote: Whether not to believe that my sins are pardoned, be indeed unbelief?]
I know that most poor troubled christians, when they complain of the sin of unbelief, do mean by it, their not believing that they are sincere believers, and personally justified, and shall be saved. And I know that some divines have affirmed, that the sense of that article of the creed, "I believe the remission of sins," is, I believe my sins are actually forgiven. But the truth is, to believe that I am elect or justified, or that my sins are forgiven, or that I am a sincere believer, is not to believe any word of God at all: for no word of God doth say any of these; nor any thing equivalent; nor any thing out of which it can be gathered: for it is a rational conclusion; and one of the premises which do infer it, must be found in myself by reflection, or internal sense, and self-knowledge. The Scripture only saith, "He that truly believeth is justified, and shall be saved." But it is conscience, and not belief of Scripture, which must say, I do sincerely believe: therefore the conclusion, that I am justified, and shall be saved, is a rational collection from what I find in Scripture and in myself, set together; and resulting from both, can be no firmer or surer than is the weaker of the premises. Now certainty is objective or subjective; in the thing, or in my apprehension. As to objective certainty in the thing itself, all truths are equally true; but all truths are not equally discernible, there being much more cause of doubting concerning some, which are less evident, than concerning others, which are more evident. And so the truth of God's promise of justification to believers, is more certain; that is, hath fuller, surer evidence to be discerned by, than the truth of my sincere believing. And, that I sincerely believe, is the more debile of the premises, and therefore the conclusion followeth this in its debility; and so can be no article of faith. And as to the subjective certainty, that varies according to men's various apprehensions. The premises, as in their evidence or aptitude to ascertain us, are the cause of the conclusion as evident, or knowable. And the premises, as apprehended, are the cause of the conclusion as known.
[Sidenote: Whether a man can be more certain that be believeth, than he is that thing believed is true?]