Part 402

I. Because you may find in writings between the protestants and papists, that it is become a controversy, whether by "flesh," in Scripture, (where this sin is mentioned,) be meant the body itself, or the soul so far as it is unregenerate, I shall briefly first resolve this question. When we speak of the unregenerate part, we mean not that the soul hath two parts, whereof one is regenerate, and the other unregenerate: but as the purblind eye hath both light and darkness on the same subject, so is it with the soul which is regenerate but in part, that is, in an imperfect degree: and by the unregenerate part is meant, the whole soul, so far as it is unregenerate. The word "flesh," in its primary signification, is taken for that part of the body, as such, without respect to sin; and next for the whole body, as distinct from the soul. But in respect to sin and duty, it is taken, 1. Sometimes for the sensitive appetite, not as sinful in itself, but as desiring that which God hath obliged reason to deny. 2. More frequently, for this sensitive appetite, as inordinate, and so sinful in its own desires. 3. Most frequently, for both the inordinate sensitive appetite itself, and the rational powers, so far as they are corrupted by it, and sinfully disposed to obey it, or to follow, inordinately, sensual things. But then the name is primarily taken for the sensual appetite itself, (as diseased,) and but by participation for the rational powers. For the understanding of which, you must consider, 1. That the appetite itself might innocently (even in innocency) desire a forbidden object; when it was not the appetite that was forbidden, but the desire of the will, or the actual taking it. That a man in a fever doth thirst for more than he may lawfully drink, is not of itself a sin; but to desire it by practical volition, or to drink it, is a sin; for it is these that God forbids, and not the thirst, which is not in our power to extinguish. That Adam had an appetite to the forbidden fruit was not his sin; but that his will obeyed his appetite, and his mouth did eat. For the appetite and sensitive nature are of God, and are in nature antecedent to the law. God made us men before he gave us laws; and the law commandeth us not to alter ourselves from what he made us, or any thing else which is naturally out of our power. But it is the sin of the will and executive powers, to do that evil which consisteth in obeying an innocent appetite. The appetite is necessary, and not free; and therefore God doth not direct his commands or prohibitions to it directly, but to the reason and free-will. 2. But since man's fall, the appetite itself is corrupted and become inordinate, that is, more impetuous, violent, and unruly than it was in the state of innocency, by the unhappy distempers that have befallen the body itself. For we find now by experience, that a man that useth himself to sweet and wholesome temperance, hath no such impetuous strivings of his appetite against his reason (if he be healthful) as those have that are either diseased, or used to obey their appetites. And if use and health make so great alteration, we have cause to think that the depravation of nature by the fall did more. 3. This inordinate appetite is sin, by participation; so far as the appetite may be said to be free by participation, though not in itself; because it is the appetite of a rational, free agent: for though sin be first in the will in its true form, yet it is not the will only that is the subject of it, (though primarily it be,) but the whole man, so far as his acts are voluntary: for the will hath the command of the other faculties; and they are voluntary acts which the will either commands, or doth not forbid when it can and ought. To lie is a voluntary sin of the man, and the tongue partaketh of the guilt. The will might have kept out that sin, which caused a disorder in the appetite. If a drunkard or a glutton provoke a venereous, inordinate appetite in himself, that lust is his sin, because it is voluntarily provoked. 4. Yet such additions of inordinacy, as men stir up in any appetite, by their own actual sins and customs, are more aggravated and dangerous to the soul, than that measure of distemper which is merely the fruit of original sin. 5. This inordinateness of the sensitive appetite, with the mere privation of rectitude in the mind and will, is enough to cause man's actual sin. For if the horses be headstrong, the mere weakness, sleepiness, negligence, or absence of the coachman is enough to concur to the overthrow of the coach: so if the reason and will had no positive inclinations to evil or sensual objects, yet if they have not so much light and love to higher things as will restrain the sensual appetite, it hath positive inclination enough in itself to forbidden things to ruin the soul by actual sin. 6. Yet, though it be a great controversy among divines, I conceive that in the rational powers themselves, there are positive, habitual, inordinate inclinations to sensual, forbidden things. For as actually it is certain the reason of the proud and covetous do contrive, and oft approve the sin, and the will embrace it; so these are done so constantly in a continued stream of action by the whole man, that it seems apparent that the same faculties which run out in such strong and constant action, are themselves the subjects of much of the inclining, positive habits: and if it be so in additional, acquired sin, it is like it was so in original sin. 7. Though sin be formally subjected first in the will, yet materially it is first in the sensitive appetite (at least this sin of flesh-pleasing or sensuality is). The flesh or sensitive part is the first desirer, though it be sin no further than it is voluntary. 8. All this set together telleth you further, that the word "flesh" signifieth the sensual inclinations of the whole man; but first and principally, the corrupted sensual appetite; and the mind and will's (whether privative or positive) concurrence, but secondarily, and as falling in with sense. The appetite, 1. Preventeth reason. 2. And resisteth reason. 3. And at last corrupteth and enticeth reason and will, to be its servants and purveyors.