_Instance_ I. The first and second causes are conjoined in their operations, and therefore must not be put asunder. If the way of influx, concourse, or co-operation be dark and unsearchable to you, do not deny that it is, because you see not how it is. The honour of the first and second cause also are conjunct, according to their several interests in the effects: do not therefore imagine, that all the honour ascribed to the second cause is denied or taken away from the first; for then you understand not their order: otherwise you would see, that as the second causeth independence on the first, and insubordination to it, and hath no power but what is communicated by it, so it hath no honour but what is received from it; and that it is no less honour for the first cause to operate mediately by the second, than immediately by itself: and that there is no less of the power, wisdom, or goodness of God, in an effect produced by means and second causes, than in that which he produceth of himself only, without them: and that it is his goodness to communicate a power of good to his creatures, and the honour of working and causing under him: but he never loseth any thing by communicating, nor hath the less himself by giving to his creatures: for if all that honour that is given to the creature were taken injuriously from God, then God would never have made the world, nor made a saint; and then the worst creatures would least dishonour God: then he would not shine by the sun, but by himself immediately: and then he would never glorify either saint or angel. But on the contrary, it is God's honour to work by adapted means; and all their honour is truly his; as all the commendation of a clock or watch is given to the workman. And though God do not all so immediately, as to use no means or second causes; yet is he never the further from the effect, but, _immediatione virtutis et suppositi_, is himself as near as if he used none.
_Instance_ II. The special providence of God, and his being the first universal cause, are conjunct with the culpability of sinners; and no man must put these asunder. Those that cannot see just how they are conjoined, may be sure that they are conjoined. It is no dishonour to an engineer that he can make a watch which shall go longer than he is moving it with his finger. Nor is it a dishonour to our Creator, that he can make a creature which can morally determine itself to an action as commanded or forbidden, without the predetermination of his Maker, though not without his universal concourse necessary to action as action. If Adam could not do this through the natural impossibility of it, then the law was, that he should die the death if he did not overcome God, or do that which was naturally impossible; and this was the nature of his sin. Few dare say, that God cannot make a free, self-determining agent; and if he can, we shall easily prove that he hath; and the force of their opposition then is vanished.
_Instance_ III. The omniscience of God, and his dominion, government, and decrees, are conjunct with the liberty and sin of man: yet these by many are put asunder: as if God must either be ignorant or be the author of sin! As if he made one poor, by decreeing to make another rich! As if he cannot be a perfect governor, unless he procure all his subjects perfectly to keep his laws! As if all the fault of those that break the law, were to be laid upon the maker of the law! As if all God's will _de debito_ were not effective of its proper work, unless man fulfil it in the event! And as if it were possible for any creature to comprehend the way of the Creator's knowledge.
_Instance_ IV. Many would separate nature and grace, which God the author of both conjoineth. When grace supposeth nature, and in her garden soweth all her seed, and exciteth and rectifieth all her powers; yet these men talk as if nature had been annihilated, or grace came to annihilate it, and not to cure it. As if the leprosy and disease of nature were nature itself! And as if natural good had been lost as much as moral good! As if man were not man till grace made him a man!
_Instance_ V. Many separate the natural power of a sinner from his moral impotency, and his natural freedom of will from his moral servitude, as if they were inconsistent, when they are conjunct. As if the natural faculty might not consist with an evil disposition; or a natural power with an habitual unwillingness to exercise it aright. And as if a sinner were not still a man.