θήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, ἐπεὶ μή ποτε] ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῇ 6
διαθέμενος.
q Exod. σται. XXIV. 5,6;
18. ὅθεν οὐδ᾽
19. Ἰλαληθείσης γὰρ πάσης ἐντολῆς κατὰ νόμον 2 ὑπὸ
ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς αἵματος ἐγκεκαίνι-
Lev. xvi. Μωῦσέως παντὶ τῷ λαῷ, λαβὼν τὸ αἷμα τῶν μόσχων καὶ τράγων,
14,15, 18.
μετὰ ὕδατος καὶ ἐρίου κοκκίνου καὶ ὑσσώπου, αὐτό τε τὸ βιβλίον
1 μη ποτε SCADCEKLP; µη τοτε τὸ", 2 T.R. in ΜΑ; insert art. with QcACD*,.
words mean that before the inheritance, alluded to in ver. 15, could become the possession of those to whom it had been promised, Christ must die. He is thus representedasa testator. The illustration from the general law relating to wills or testaments extends only to the one point that Christ’s people could inherit only on condition of Christ’s death. The veason of Christ’s death receives no illustration. He did not die merely to make room for the heir. The objections to this interpre- tation are (1) the constant Biblical usage by which, with one doubtful exception in Gal. iii., διαθήκη stands for ““ covenant,” not for “will”. On this point see the strong statement of Hatch, Essays in Bibl. Greek, p. 48. ‘There can be little doubt that the word must be invariably taken in this sense of ‘‘ covenant” in the N.T., and especially in a book which is so impregnated with the language of the LXX as the epistle to the Hebrews”’. (2) His argument regarding covenants receives no help from usages which obtain in connection with testaments which are not covenants. The fact that both could be spoken of under the same name shows that they were related in some way; but presumably the writer had in view things and not merely words. To adduce the fact that in the case of wills the death of the testator is the condition of validity, is, of course, no proof at all that a death is necessary to make a covenant valid. (3) The argu- ment of ver. 18 is destroyed if we understand vv. 16, 17 of wills; for in this verse it is the first covenant that is referred to.
But is it possible to retain the meaning “covenant”? Westcott, Rendall, Hatch, Moulton and others think it is possible. To support his argument, proving the necessity of Christ’s death, the writer adduces the general law that he who makes a covenant does so at the expense of life. What is meant becomes plain in the 18th verse, for in the covenant there alluded to, the covenanting people were received into covenant through death.
That covenant only became valid ἐπὶ νεκροῖς over the dead bodies of the vic- tims slain as representing the people. Whatever this substitutionary death may have meant, it was necessary to the rati- fication of the covenant. The sacrifices may have been expiatory, indicating that all old debts and obligations were can- celled and that the covenanters entered into this covenant as clean and new men; or they may have meant that the terms of the covenant were immutable; or that the people died to the past and became wholly the people of God. In any case the dead victims were necessary, and without them, χωρὶς αἵματος, the coven- ant was not inaugurated or ratified. Great light has been thrown on this pas- sage by Dr. Trumbull in his Blood Coven- ant, in which he shows the universality of that form of compact and the significance of the blood. The rite of interchanging blood or tasting one another’s blood, in- dicates that the two are bound in one life and must be all in all to one an- other. On the whole, this interpretation is to be preferred. Certainly it connects. much better with what follows. For having shown that by dead victims all covenants are ratified, the writer proceeds ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς αἵμ- ατος ἐνκεκαίνισται, ‘wherefore not even the first,’”’—although imperfect and temporary—‘‘ was inaugurated with- out blood,”z.e., without death. [The per- fect here as elsewhere in Hebrews is scarcely distinguishable from the aorist.] Proof that this statement regarding the first covenant is correct he forthwith gives in vv. 19-20.