_Answ._ If she be one that is either like to do good to the infidels, heretics, or bad persons whom they must converse with, she may suppose that God calleth her to receive good by doing good; or if she be a confirmed, well-settled christian, and not very like, either by infection, or by want of helps, to be unsettled and miscarry, it seemeth to me the safest way to follow her husband. She must lose indeed God's public ordinances by following him: but it is not imputable to her, as being out of her choice; and she must lose the benefits and neglect the duties of the conjugal ordinance, if she do not follow him. But if she be a person under such weaknesses, as make her removal apparently dangerous as to her perseverance and salvation, and her husband will by no means be prevailed with to change his mind, the case then is very difficult, what is her duty, and who is the deserter. Nay, if he did but lead her into a country where her life were like to be taken away, (as under the Spanish Inquisition,) unless her suffering were like to be as serviceable to Christ as her life. Indeed these cases are so difficult, that I will not decide them; the inconveniencies (or mischiefs rather) are great which way soever she take: but I most incline to judge as followeth: viz. It is considerable first, what marriage obligeth her to, simply of its own nature; and what it may do next, by any superadded contract, or by the law or custom of the land, or any other accident. As to the first, it seemeth to me, that every one's obligation is so much first to God, and then to their own souls and lives; that marriage as such, which is for mutual help, as a means to higher ends, doth not oblige her to forsake all the communion of saints, and the place or country where God is lawfully worshipped, and to lose all the helps of public worship, and to expose her soul both to spiritual famine and infection, to the apparent hazard of her salvation (and perhaps bring her children into the same misery); nor hath God given her husband any power to do her so much wrong, nor is the marriage covenant to be interpreted to intend it. But what any human law or contract, or other accident which is of greater public consequence, may do more than marriage of itself, is a distinct case which must have a particular discussion.
_Quest._ But what if the husband would only have her follow him, to the forsaking of her estate, and undoing herself and children in the world (as in the case of Galeacius Carracciolus, Marquis of Vicum); yea, and if it were without just cause?
_Answ._ If it be for greater spiritual gain, (as in his case,) she is bound to follow him; but if it be apparently foolish, to the undoing of her and her children without any cause, I see not that marriage simply obligeth a woman so to follow a fool in beggary, or out of a calling, or to her ruin. But if it be at all a controvertible case, whether the cause be just or not, then the husband being governor must be judge. The laws of the land are supposed to be just, which allow a woman by trustees to secure some part of her former estate from her husband's disposal; much more may she beforehand secure herself and children from being ruined by his wilful folly: but she can by no contract except herself from his true government.
Yet still she must consider, whether she can live continently in his absence; otherwise the greatest sufferings must be endured, to avoid incontinency.
2. Moreover, in all these cases, a temporary removal may be further followed, than a perpetual transmigration, because it hath fewer evil consequents.
And if either party renounce the relation itself, it is a fuller desertion, and clearer discharge of the other party, than a mere removal is.
_Quest._ XVI. What if a man or wife know that the other in hatred doth really intend by poison, or other murder, to take away their life? May they not depart?
_Answ._ They may not do it upon a groundless or rash surmise; nor upon a danger which by other lawful means may be avoided (as by vigilancy, or the magistrate, or especially by love and duty). But in plain danger, which is not otherwise like to be avoided, I doubt not, but it may be done, and ought. For it is a duty to preserve our own lives as well as our neighbours'. And when marriage is contracted for mutual help, it is naturally implied, that they shall have no power to deprive one another of life (however some barbarous nations have given men power of the lives of their wives). And killing is the grossest kind of desertion, and a greater injury and violation of the marriage covenant than adultery; and may be prevented by avoiding the murderer's presence, if that way be necessary. None of the ends of marriage can be attained, where the hatred is so great.
_Quest._ XVII. If there be but a fixed hatred of each other, is it inconsistent with the ends of marriage? And is parting lawful in such a case?