_Direct._ III. Vow not in a passion: stay till the storm be over: whether it be anger or desire, or whatever the passion be, delay and deliberate before you vow; for when passion is up, the judgment is upon great disadvantage. In your passion you are apt to be most peremptory and confident when you are most deceived: if it be your duty to vow, it will be your duty to-morrow when you are calm. If you say, that duty must not be delayed, and that you must do it while the Spirit moveth you: I answer, Was it not as much a duty before your passion was kindled as now? It is no sinful delaying of so great a duty, to stay till you have well proved whether it be of God. If it be the Spirit of Christ that moveth you to it, he will be willing that you deliberate and try it by that word which the same Spirit hath indited to be your rule. God's Spirit worketh principally upon the judgment and the will, by settled convictions, which will endure a rational trial: it is liker to be your own spirit which worketh principally on the passion, and will not endure the trial, nor come into the light, John iii. 18, 19; Isa. viii. 20.
_Direct._ IV. Make not a vow of things indifferent and unnecessary: if they be not good, in a true, comparing, practical judgment, which considereth all accidents and circumstances, they are no fit matter for a vow. Some say, things indifferent are the fittest matter both for vows and human laws; but either they speak improperly or untruly, and therefore dangerously at the best. If an idle word be a sin, then an idle action is not a thing to be vowed, because it is not a thing to be done, being as truly a sin as an idle word: and that which is wholly indifferent is idle; for if it be good for any thing, it is not wholly indifferent; and because it is antecedently useless, it is consequently sinful to be done.
_Object._ I. But those that say things indifferent may be vowed, mean not, things useless or unprofitable to any good end; but only those things that are good and useful, but not commanded: such as are the matter of God's counsels, and tend to man's perfection, as to vow chastity, poverty, and absolute obedience.
_Answ._ There are no such things as are morally good, and not commanded: this is the fiction of men that have a mind to accuse God's laws and government of imperfection, and think sinful man can do better than he is commanded, when none but Christ ever did so well.[49]
_Quest._ I. What is moral goodness in any creature and subject, but a conformity to his ruler's will expressed in his law? And if this conformity be its very form and being, it cannot be that any thing should be morally good that is not commanded.
_Quest._ II. Doth not the law of God command us to love him with all our heart, and soul, and strength, and accordingly to serve him? And is it possible to give him more than all; or can God come after and counsel us to give him more than is possible?
_Quest._ III. Doth not the law of nature oblige us to serve God to the utmost of our power? He that denieth it, is become unnatural, and must deny God to be God, or deny himself to be his rational creature: for nothing is more clear in nature, than that the creature who is nothing, and hath nothing but from God, and is absolutely his own, doth owe him all that he is able to do.
_Quest._ IV. Doth not Christ determine the case to his disciples, Luke xvii. 10?
A middle between good and evil in morality is a contradiction: there is no such thing; for good and evil are the whole of morality: without these species there is no morality.
_Object._ II. It seems then you hold that there is nothing indifferent, which is a paradox.
[Sidenote: Whether any things be indifferent?]
_Answ._ No such matter: there are thousands and millions of things that are indifferent; but they are things natural only, and not things moral. They are indifferent as to moral good and evil, because they are neither; but they are not _indifferentia moralia_: the indifferency is a negation of any morality in them _in genere_, as well as of both the species of morality.[50] Whatsoever participateth not of virtue or vice, and is not eligible or refusable by a moral agent as such, hath no morality in it. There may be two words so equal as it may be indifferent which you speak; and two eggs so equal, as that it may be indifferent which you eat; but that is no more than to say, the choosing of one before the other is not _actus moralis_: there is no matter of morality in the choice.
_Object._ III. But if there may be things natural that are indifferent, why not things moral?
_Answ._ As goodness is convertible with entity, there is no natural being but is good: as goodness signifieth commodity, there is nothing but is profitable or hurtful, and that is good to one that is hurtful to another: but if it were not so, yet such goodness or badness is but accidental to natural being; but moral goodness and badness is the whole essence of morality.