_Answ._ If you had included himself, it is certain that he cannot be greater than the whole, because he cannot be greater than himself. But seeing you speak of the whole in contradistinction from him, I answer, that indeed _in genere causæ finalis_, the sovereign is _universis minor_, that is, the whole kingdom is naturally more worth than one, and their felicity a greater good; or else the _bonum publicum_, or _salus populi_, could not be the end of government; but this is nothing to our case; for we are speaking of governing power as a means to this end; and so _in genere causæ efficientis_, the sovereign (yea, and his lowest officer) hath more authority or _jus regendi_ than all the people as such (for they all as such have none at all); even as the church is of more worth than the pastor, and yet the pastor alone hath more authority to administer the sacraments, and to govern the people, than all the flock hath; for they have none either to use or give, (whatever some say to the contrary,) but only choose him to whom God will give it.[43]
_Object._ V. Saith the reverend author, lib. viii. p. 194, "Neither can any man with reason think, but that the first institution of kings, (a sufficient consideration wherefore their power should always depend on that from which it did always flow,) by original influence of power from the body into the king, is the cause of kings' dependency in power upon the body: by dependency we mean subordination and subjection."
_Answ._ 1. But if their institution _in genere_ was of God, and that give them their power, and it never flowed from the body at all, then all your superstructure falleth with your ground-work. 2. And here you seem plainly to confound all kingdoms by turning the _pars imperans_ into the _pars subdita_, and _vice versa_; if the king be subject, how are they his subjects? I will not infer what this will lead them to do, when they are taught that kings are in subordination and subjection to them. Sad experience hath showed us what this very principle would effect.
_Object._ VI. Ibid.[44] "A manifest token of which dependency may be this; as there is no more certain argument, that lands are held under any as lords, than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs fall unto them by escheat; in like manner it doth follow rightly that seeing dominion when there is none to inherit it, returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors of it, did hold it in dependence on the body; so that by comparing the body with the head as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both; fundamentally and radically in one, in the other derivatively; in one the habit, in the other the act of power."
_Answ._ Power no more falleth to the multitude by escheat, than the power of the pastor falls to the church, or the power of the physician to the hospital, or the power of the schoolmaster to the scholars; that is, not at all. When all the heirs are dead, they are an ungoverned community, that have power to choose a governor, but no power to govern, neither (as you distinguish it) in habit nor in act, originally nor derivatively. As it is with a corporation when the mayor is dead, the power falleth not to the people.
Therefore there is no good ground given for your following question, "May a body politic then at all times withdraw in whole or in part the influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconveniences do grow thereby?" Though you answer this question soberly yourself, it is easy to see how the multitude may be tempted to answer it on your grounds, especially if they think your inconvenience turn into a necessity; and what use they will make of your next words, "It must be presumed that supreme governors will not in such cases oppose themselves, and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with public detriment." A strange presumption.
_Object._ VII. "The axioms of our regal government are these, _Lex facit regem_; the king's grant of any favour made contrary to law is void; _Rex nihil potest nisi quod jure potest_."
_Answ._ If _lex_ be taken improperly for the constituting contract between prince and people, and if your _facit_ have respect only to the species and person, and not the substance of the power itself, then I contradict you not. But if _lex_ be taken properly for _authoritativa constitutio debiti_, or the signification of the sovereign's will to oblige the subject, then _lex non facit regem, sed rex legem_.[45]