_Object._ I. But, saith worthy Mr. Richard Hooker, Eccl. Polit. lib. i. sect. 10. p. 21,[40] "That which we spake of the power of government, must here be applied to the power of making laws, whereby to govern; which power, God hath over all, and by the natural law, whereto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belongeth so properly to the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore, which public approbation hath not made so."
_Answ._ Because the authority of this famous divine is with his party so great, I shall adventure to say something, lest his words do the more harm; but not by confident opposition, but humble proposal and submission of my judgment to superiors and wiser men, as being conscious of my own inferiority and infirmity. I take all this to be an assertion no where by him proved (and by me elsewhere disproved fully). Laws are the effects and signs of the ruler's will; and instruments of government. Legislation is the first part of government; and if the whole body are naturally governors, the _pars imperans_ and _pars subdita_ are confounded. If the most absolute monarch can make no laws, then disobeying them were no fault. It is enough that their power be derived from God immediately, though the persons be chosen by men. Their authority is not derived from the people's consent, but from God, by their consent, as a bare condition _sine qua non_. What if a community say all to their elected king, "We take not ourselves to have any governing power to give or use, but we only choose you or your family to that office which God hath instituted, who in that institution giveth you the power upon our choice;" can any man prove, that such a king hath no power, but is a tyrant; because the people disclaim the giving of the power; when indeed they do their duty? Remember that in all this we speak not of the government of this or that particular kingdom, but of kingdoms and other commonwealths indefinitely.[41]
_Object._ II. But, saith he, lib. viii. p. 192, "Unto me it seemeth almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude before any certain form of regimen established, hath under God supreme authority, full dominion over itself,"--
_Answ._ If by dominion were meant propriety, every individual hath it; but for governing power, it seemeth as clear to me, that your independent multitude hath no civil power of government at all; but only a power to choose them governors; while they have no governors, they have no governing power, for that maketh a governor.
_Object._ III. Ibid. "A man who is lord of himself, may be made another's servant," &c.
_Answ._ 1. He may hire out himself to labour for another; because he hath so far the power of himself, and his labour is his own, which he may sell for wages; but in a family, that the master be the governor to see God's laws obeyed by his servants, is of divine appointment, and this governing power the servant giveth not to his master, but only maketh himself the object of it. 2. The power that nature giveth a man over himself, is _tota specie_ distinct from civil government; (as Dr. Hammond hath well showed against I. G.) An individual person hath not that power of his own life as the king hath. He may not put himself to death, for that which the king may put him to death for. 3. If this were true, that every individual, by self-resignation, might give a king his power over him; yet _a posse ad esse non valet consequentia_; and that it is not so is proved, in that God the universal Sovereign hath prevented them, by determining himself, of his own officers, and giving them their power in the same charter by which he enableth the people to choose them. Therefore it is no better reasoning than to say, If all the persons in London subjected themselves to the lord mayor, he would thereby receive his power from them, when the king hath prevented that already, by giving him the power himself in his charter; and leaving only the choice of the person to them; and that under the direction of the rules which he hath given them.[42]
_Object._ IV. But saith he, lib. viii. p. 193, "In kingdoms of this quality, (as this we live in,) the highest governor hath indeed universal dominion, but with dependency upon that whole entire body over the several parts whereof he hath dominion; so that it standeth for an axiom in this case, The king is _major singulis, universis minor_."