1. That hurt that cometh to a man's soul is greater than the hurt that befalleth the body; and therefore if my suing a man at law be like to hurt his soul by uncharitableness, or to hurt my own, or the souls of others, by scandal or disturbances, I must rather suffer any mere bodily injuries, than use that means; but if yet greater hurt to souls would follow that bodily suffering of mine, the case is then altered the other way. So if by forgiving debts or wrongs, I be liker to do more good to the soul of him whom I forgive, or others, than the recovery of my own, or the righting of myself, is like any way to equal, I am obliged to forgive that debt or wrong.
2. The good or hurt which cometh to a community or to many, is (_cæteris paribus_) to be more regarded than that which cometh to myself or any one alone. Because many are of more worth than one; and because God's honour (_cæteris paribus_) is more concerned in the good of many than of one. Therefore I must not seek my own right to the hurt of many, either of their souls or bodies, unless some greater good require it.
3. The good or hurt of public persons, magistrates, or pastors, is (_cæterisc paribus_) of more regard than the good or hurt of single men: therefore (_cæteris paribus_) I must not right myself to the dishonour or hurt of governors; (no, though I were none of their charge or subjects;) because the public good is more concerned in their honour or welfare than in mine. The same may be said of persons by their gifts and interests more eminently serviceable to God and the common good than I am.
4. The good or hurt of a near relation, of a dear friend, of a worthy person, is more to be regarded by me, _cæteris paribus_, than the good or hurt of a vile, unworthy person, or a stranger. And therefore the Israelites might not take usury of a poor brother, which yet they might do of an alien of another land! The laws of nature and friendship may more oblige me to one than to another, though they were supposed equal in themselves. Therefore I am not bound to remit a debt or wrong to a thief, or deceiver, or a vile person, when a nearer or worthier person would be equally damnified by his benefit. And thus far, (if without any partial self-love a man can justly estimate himself,) he may not only as he is nearest himself, but also for his real worth, prefer his own commodity before the commodity of a more unworthy and unserviceable person.
5. Another man's necessities are more regardable than our own superfluities; as his life is more regardable than our corporal delights. Therefore it is a great sin for any man to reduce another to extremity, and deprive him of necessaries for his life, merely to vindicate his own right in superfluities, for the satisfaction of his concupiscence and sensual desires. If a poor man steal to save his own or his children's lives, and the rich man vindicate his own, merely to live in greater fulness or gallantry in the world, he sinneth both the sin of sensuality and uncharitableness (but how far for the common good he is bound to prosecute the thief as criminal, is a case which depends on other circumstances). And this is the most common case, in which the forgiving of debts and damages is required in Scripture, viz. When the other is poor and we are rich, and his necessities require it as an act of charity (and also the former case, when the hurt by our vindication is like to be greater than our benefit will countervail).
_Quest._ II. What is the meaning of those words of Christ, Matt. v. 38-42, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also; and whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him two: give to him that asketh thee; and from him that would borrow of thee turn thou not away?"