_Answ._ If only good, as such, be the object of love, then certainly none should be loved but in proportion to his goodness. But you must distinguish between mere natural and sensitive love or appetite, and rational love; and between love, and the effects of love; and between natural goodness in the object, and moral goodness. And so I further answer, 1. There is in every man a natural and sensitive love of himself and his own pleasure and felicity, and an averseness to death and pain and sorrow, as there is in every brute: and this God hath planted there for the preservation of the creature. This falleth not under commands or prohibitions directly, because it is not free but necessary; as no man is commanded or forbidden to be hungry, or thirsty, or weary, or the like: it is not this love which is meant when we are commanded to love our neighbour as ourselves. For I am not commanded to feel hunger, and thirst, nor to desire meat and drink by the sensitive appetite for my neighbour: nor sensitively to feel his pain or pleasure, nor to have that natural aversation from death and pain, nor sensitive desire of life and pleasure, for him as for myself. But the love here spoken of, is that volition with the due affection conjunct, which is our rational love, as being the act of our highest faculty, and falling under God's command. As to the sensitive love, it proceedeth not upon the sense or estimate of goodness in the person who loveth himself or any other (as beasts love their young ones without respect to their excellency). But it is rational love which is proportioned to the estimated goodness of the thing beloved. 2. Physical goodness may be in an object which hath no moral goodness; and this may contain a capacity of moral goodness: and each of them is amiable according to its nature and degree. 3. Beneficence is sometimes an effect of love, and sometimes an effect of wisdom only as to the object, and of love to something else; but it is never love itself. Usually benevolence is an act of love, and beneficence an effect, but not always. I may do good to another without any love to him, for some ends of my own, or for the sake of another. And a man may be obliged to greater beneficence, where he is not obliged to greater love.
And now to the instances, I further answer, 1. When we had no being, God did not properly love us _in esse reali_ (unless you will go to our co-existence in eternity; for we were not _in esse reali_); but only as we were _in esse cognito_; which is but to love the idea in himself: but he purposed to make us, and to make us lovely, and to do us good, and so he had that which is called _amor benevolentiæ_ to us: which properly was not love to us, but a love to himself, and the idea in his own eternal mind, which is called a loving us _in esse cognito_, and a purpose to make us good and lovely. That which is not lovely is not an object of love: man was not lovely indeed, when he was not; therefore he was not an object of love (but _in esse cognito_.) The same we say of God's loving us when we were enemies: he really loved us with complacency so far as our physical goodness made us lovely; and as morally lovely he did not love us, otherwise than _in esse cognito_. But he purposed to make us morally lovely, and gave us his mercies to that end; and so loved us with a love of benevolence, as it is called; which signifieth no more than out of a complacence (or love) to himself, and to us, as physically good, to purpose to make us morally good and happy. As to the incident difficulty of love beginning _de novo_ in God, I have fully resolved it elsewhere.[169]
2. So also we must love a wicked man with a love of benevolence: which properly is but to love him in his physical worth, and his capacity of moral goodness and happiness, and thereupon (but especially through the love of God) to desire his happiness.
3. And as to the loving of ourselves, (besides the sensitive love before mentioned which respecteth self as self, and not as good,) a wicked man may rationally love himself according to his physical goodness as a man, which containeth his capacity of moral goodness, and so of being holy and serviceable to God and to good men, and happy in the fruition of God. But beyond all such goodness (which only is amiableness) no man may rationally love himself or any other, with the true formal act of love, which is complacence; though he may wish good to himself or another beyond the present goodness which is in them; nay, he wisheth them good, not because they are good, but because they want good.