as men,n says Bishop Taylor, "have a right to truth;" "for there is in mankind a universal contract implied in all their intercourses, and words being instituted to declare the mind, and for no other end, he that hears me speak bath a right in justice to be done him that, as far as I can, what I speak be true; for else he by words does not know your mind, and then as good and better not speak at all" (' Ductor Dubi- tantium,' 3, 2, 6). There are certain classes of men who have not a right to truth, such as madmen, and sick persons under special circumstances; and in these cases it is justi6able to say to them what is best for them, whether true or not; and in case of declared war the right to truth ceases, and ia known to cease, so that no immoral deception takes place when false news is spread or stratagems adopted. But in time of peace and in ordinary cases, "Thou shalt not deceive thy neighbour" is the rule of conduct.. Whether thia deception takes place by means of a lie, or of an equivocation, or of a mental reservation makes no difference in the morality of the act. The defence of equivocation rests upon a confusion of two things totally differentr--material truth and moral truthfulness, The statement that the sun rises or sinks is materially false, be- cause it remains stationary. But the man who makes such a statement is morally truth- ful, ifhe makes it not intending to deceive his neighbour and knowing that he will not be deceived. A statement that the sun had not 1isen (in the morning) or gone down (Jn the evening), if made with the purpose of deceiving the person addressed, and with aa ulterior object on the part of the speaker, although materially true, would imply moral untruthfulness on the part of the speaker, and therefore is a lie. Bishops Taylor and Sanderson were some of the first theologians who, recurring to the severer morality of Augustine and the early Fathers, cast away with scorn the puerile confusion between moral truthfulness and material truth on which the system of modern Roman casuistry in this department rests. "He that tells a lie," says Bishop Taylor, "and by his ment.a.l restriction says he tells a truth, tells two lies" (' Ductor Dubitantium,' iii. 28). On the other hand, the Church of Rome teaches that the person addressed may be deceived te any amount, provided that the deception is effected by a form of words which is true in liOme sense apprehended by the speaker, though untrue in the sense understood by the other party. Accordingly, it is taught by an authority that may not be gainsaid by any member of that communion, that if a man prefixes the words" I say that" to a sentence, he may with a good reason make any false statement that he pleases, because in hiil own mind he means only to declare that he is making use of the words following that pre6x, not that he is asserting their truth, as the person that he addresses supposes him to be doing (S. Alfonso de' Liguori,' Theo!. Moral.,' iv. 451). Contrast with this the injunctions of the apostle," Wherefore putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour: for we are members one of another" (Eph. iv. 25); "Lie not one rto another, seeing that ye hove put off the old man with his deeds" (Col. iii. 9); and the command of the prophet, "Speak ye every man the truth to his neigh hour; execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates: and let none of you imagine evil iu your hearts against his neighbour; and love no false ooth: for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord" (Zech. viii. 16, 17); and the teaching of the early Church, "A man lies when he thinks something to be false and says it as though true, whether it be true or false. Mark the addition that I have made. Whether it be really true or false, yet, if a man thinks it false and assert it as true, he lies, for he is aiming to deceive . . . . His heart is double, not single; he does but bring out what he has there" (St. Augustine, 'Serm.' 133); and the teaching of the reformed Church, "Our result is that the party swearing after this manner both sinn~th in his equivocal oath, and is notwithstanding that tacit equivocation bound in conscience unto the performance of his promise in that sense which the words yield of thomselves, and are, without con- straint, apt to beget upon the minds of others. Unless he act accor,lingly, he is not guiltless of perjury" (tianderson,' Obligation of Oaths '). In the Book of the Ilevelation. we read, "But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone" (Rev. xxi. 8). Ver. 12," Ye shall not ,wear by my Name falsely, neitl,er shall thou profa11e the Name of thy God," contains three injunctions: First, a comrnar.d that on due occasions we arn to make appeal to God by ,solemn oath; secondly, a probibitiln of perj,1ry; thirdly, a command to reverence God II Name, THE BOOK OF LEVITICUS. [en, XIX. 1-37.
Frederick Meyrick [1827-1906] • SECTION 331
The Pulpit Commentary — Leviticus — Section 331
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