them. So far as they succeed to the satisfaction of those who make them, they change the relation of the soul to the truth, and, of course, to God. The reception of the truth is not an act of faith, or of trusl> in God ; but of confidence in our own speculations. Self is substituted for God as the ground of confidence. The man's whole inward state is thereby changed. History, moreover, proves that Dogmatism is the predecessor of Rationalism. The natural tendency and the actual consequences of the indulgence of a dis- position to demand philosophical demonstration for articles of faith, is a state of mind which revolts at authority, and refuses to admit as true what it cannot comprehend and prove. And this state of mind, as it is incompatible with faith, is the parent of unbelief and of all its consequences. There is no safety for us, therefore, but to remain within the limits which God has assigned us. Let us rely on our senses, within the sphere of our sense perceptions ; on our reason within the sphere of rational truths ; and on- God, and God alone, in all that rclates to the things of God. He only truly knows, who consents with the docility of a child to be taught of God.
§ 5. Proper Office of Reason in Matters of Religiov. A. Reason Necessary for the Reception of a Revelation.
Christians, in repudiating Rationalism in all its forms, do not re- ject the service of reason in matters of religion. They acknowl- edge its high prerogatives, and the responsibility involved in their exercise.
In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed in every rev- elation. Revelation is ther communication of truth to the mind. But the communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelations cannot be made to brutes or to idiots. Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually apprehended. A proposition, to which we attach no meaning, however important the truth it may contain, cannot be an object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or God is a spirit, unless we know the meaning of the words nothing is communicated to the mind, and the inind can affirm or deny nothing on the subject. In other words, knowledge is essential to faith. In believing we affirm the ti'uth of the proposition believed. But we can affirm nothing of that of which we know nothing. The first and indispensable office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition, or intelli- gent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception. This
60 INTRODUCTION. [Cn. in. — Rationalism.
IS what theologians are accustomed to call the usus organicus, seu^ instrumentalist rationis. About this there can be no dispute.
Difference hetioeen Knotoing and Understanding. It is impoi'tant, however, to bear in mind the difference between knowing and understanding, or comprehending. A child knows what the words " God is a spirit " mean. No created being can comprehend the Almighty unto perfection. We must know the plan of salvation; but no one can comprehend its mysteries. This distinction is recognized in every department. Men know unspeak- ably more than they understand. We know that plants grow ; that the will controls our voluntary muscles ; that Jesus Christ is God and man in two distinct natui'es, and one person forever ; but here as everywhere we are surrounded by the incomprehensible. We can rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man as a rational crea- ture, that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which convey no mean- ing to the mind. This would be not only irrational, but impossible.
B. Reason must judge of the Credibility of a Revelation.
In the second place, it is the prerogative of reason to judge of the credibility of a revelation. The word " credible " is sometimes popularly used to mean, easy of belief, i. e., probable. In its proper sense, it is antithetical to incredible. The incredible is that which cannot be believed. The credible is that which can be believed. Nothing is incredible but the impossible. What may be, may be rationally (i. e., on adequate grounds) believed.
A thing may be strange, unaccountable, unintelligible, and yet perfectly credible. Wliat is strange or unaccountable to one mind, may be perfectly familiar and plain to another. For the most lim- ited intellect or experience to make itself the standard of the pos- sible and true, would be as absurd as a man's making his visible horizon the limit of space. Unless a man is willing to believe the incomprehensible, he can believe nothing, and must dwell forever in cuter darkness. The most skeptical form of modern philoso- phy, which reduces faith and knowledge to a minimum, teaches that the incomprehensible is all we know, namely, that force is, and that it is persistent. It is most unreasonable, therefore, to urge as an objection to Christianity that it demands faith in the incorapre- \iensible.
§5, r: proper office of reason. 61
TJie Impossible cannot he believed. While this is true and plain, it is no less true that the impossible is incredible, and therefore cannot be an object of faith. Chris- tians concede to reason the judicium contradictionis, that is, the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible. If it is seen to be impossible, no authority, and no amount or kind of evidence can impose the obligation to receive it as true. Whether, however, a thing be possible or not, is not to be arbi- trarily determined. Men are prone to pronounce everything im- possible which contradicts their settled convictions, their preconcep- tions or prejudices, or which is repugnant to their feelings. Men in former times did not hesitate to say that it is impossible that the earth should turn round on its axis and move through space with incredible rapidity, and yet we not perceive it. It was pro- nounced absolutely impossible that information should be transmit- ted thousands of miles in the fraction of a second. Of course it would be folly to reject all evidence of such facts as these on the ground of their being impossible. It is no less unreasonable for men to reject the truths of revelation on the assumption that they involve the impossible, when they contradict our previous convic- tions, or when we cannot see how they can be. Men say that it is impossible that the same person can be both God and man ; and yet they admit that man is at once material and immaterial, mortal and immortal, angel and animal. The impossible cannot be true ; but reason in pronouncing a thing impossible must act rationally and not capriciously. Its judgments must be guided by principles which commend themselves to the common consciousness of men. Such principles ai'e the following : —
What is Impossible.
(1.) That is impossible which involves a contradiction ; as, that a thing is and is not ; that right is wrong, and wrong right. (2.) It is impossible that God should do, approve, or command what is morally wrong. (3.) It is impossible that He should require us to believe what contradicts any of the laws of belief which He has impressed upon our nature. (4.) It is impossible that one truth should contradict another. It is impossiijle, therefore, that God should reveal anything as true which contradicts any well authen- ticated truth, whether of intuition, experience, or previous revela- tion.
Men may abuse this prerogative of reason, as they abuse their
62 INTRODUCTION. [Ch. m. —Rationalism.
free agency. But the prerogative itself is not to be denied. We have a right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us to believe. He can no more require us to be- lieve what is absurd than to do what is wrong.
Proof of this Prerogative of Reason.
1. That reason has the prerogative of the judicium contradio' tionis, is plain, in the first place, from the very nature of the case. Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true v^'hich it sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time. From the very constitution of our nature, therefore, we are forbidden to believe the impossible. We are, consequently, not only authorized, but required to pronounce anathema an apostle or angel from heaven, who should call upon us to receive as a revelation from God anything absurd, or wicked, or inconsistent with the intellec- tual or moral nature with which He has endowed us. The subjec- tion of the human intelligence tt) God is indeed absolute ; but it is a subjection to infinite wisdom and goodness. As it is impossible that God should contradict himself, so it is impossible that He should, by an external revelation, declare that to be true wdiich by the laws of our nature He has rendered it impossible we should believe.